Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2012

On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters
Henry Paul Monaghan
Columbia Law School, monaghan@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Henry P. Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665
(2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/168

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

ESSAY
ON AVOIDING AVOIDANCE, AGENDA CONTROL,
AND RELATED MATTERS
Henry Paul Monaghan*
Legal scholars have long posited that, heuristically at least, two basic
adjudicatory models-the dispute resolution model and the law declaration
model-compete for the Court's affection along a wide spectrum of issues.
The former focuses upon judicial resolution of actual disputes between litigants. Historically, that model has been underpinned by a premise, reflected
in a wide range of doctrines, that significant barriersrightly exist to judicial
review of the constitutionality of governmental conduct. By contrast, the law
declaration model focuses on the Court itself not the litigants. Emphasizing
the judicial authority to say what the law is, it views any restraintson judicial authority solely in functional terms, terms not as litigant centered.
The dispute resolution model is usually treated as formally dominant,
followed by an exploration of the inroads made by the law declaration model.
Examination of recent, seemingly unrelated, decisions shows that this approach now gets matters pretty much backwards, at least so far as the Court
is concerned.Embracing in significant measure the premises of the law declaration model, the Court has sought to expand its hierarchicalhegemony to
ensure that: (a) It can have the final say when any other court, state or
federal, rules on the constitutionality of government conduct; and (b) it will
possess wide-ranging agenda-settingfreedom to determine what issues are to
be (or not to be) decided, irrespective of the wishes of the litigants. The latter
development in particularraises troublesome questions about the Court's appropriaterole in our polity.
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"The court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases
confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which
it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision."1
"[W]e have permitted lower courts to avoid avoidance [of constitutional questions] ....
INTRODUCTION

The Question Presented in the petition for certiorari 3 filed this
Term by the government in one of the healthcare litigation cases reads in
pertinent part:
The question presented is:
1. Whether Congress had the power under Article I of the
Constitution to enact the minimum coverage provision.
Petitioners also suggest that the Court direct the parties to address the following question:
2. Whether the suit brought by respondents to challenge the
minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care4 Act is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26
U.S.C. 7421 (a).
The government's suggestion is, at first glance, rather startling. The
Anti-Injunction Act issue was no longer in the litigation. As the government explained, it had raised this defense in the district court, but did
not appeal an adverse ruling. 5 In different litigation in the Fourth Circuit
challenging the same healthcare legislation, the government had recon1. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,joined by
Stone, Roberts & Cardozo, JJ., concurring).
2. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (Kagan, J.).
3. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2011 WL 5025286.
4. Id. at I.
5. Id. at 32.
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sidered its position and concluded that the Act did not bar relief. The
Fourth Circuit held otherwise. 6 Pointing to a circuit split, the government
suggested that counsel might be appointed to defend the Act's applicability.7 In sum, the government asked the Court to decide an issue that
neither litigant disputed. The government was entirely successful; the
Court converted the suggestion into an additional question. The Court
granted the petition, and directed the parties to brief and argue the AntiInjunction Act issue. 8 Subsequently, it appointed counsel to "brief and
argue . . . in support of the position that the Anti-Injunction Act, 26

U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the suit" with respect to the minimum coverage
provision of the healthcare act. 9
The government's suggestion is quite understandable. Respected
lower court judges had relied upon the exception-ridden anti-injunction
provision to bar any preenforcement challenge to a "regulatory penalty"
that had characteristics of a regulation, a penalty, and a tax. The government probably anticipated that the Court would add this issue to the
Question Presented. That said, however, much more seems involved:
Questions related to the validity of the healthcare legislation are issues
that the Court quite evidently believes it should resolve, and resolve now
if it can. This became quite apparent from the Court's subsequent lowvisibility grant of an unopposed motion to add parties to eliminate any
potential Article III mootness problems concerning the Act's individual
6. Id. at 32-33.
7. "Under these circumstances, we believe the Court should consider the applicability
of the Anti-Injunction Act along with the constitutional issues in this case. If, as we
anticipate, respondents take the position that the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this suit,
the Court should also consider appointing an amicus to file a brief defending the position
that the Anti-Injunction Act does bar this suit. . . ." Id. at 33.

8. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 604 (order granting certiorari). The
division in the lower courts clearly existed. Prior to the government's petition for certiorari
to the supreme Court, a divided Fourth Circuit had held that the Anti-Injunction Act
precluded review of the healthcare legislation's merits. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner,
No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) (concluding "the plain
language of the [Anti-Injunction Act] bars . . . consideration" of the constitutional
challenge); id. at *35 (Davis, J., dissenting) (arguing Anti-Injunction Act "does not strip
[courts] ofjurisdiction" in cases challenging healthcare legislation). Previously, the Sixth
Circuit had held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the court's pre-enforcement
jurisdiction to review the healthcare legislation. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651
F.3d 529, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2011) (discussing Anti-Injunction Act). After the filing of the
government's petition for certiorari, a dissenting judge on the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals also indicated that the Anti-Injunction Act barred review of the merits. See
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing
Anti-Injunction Act "poses a jurisdictional bar to . . . deciding" constitutionality of
healthcare legislation).
9. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 609, 609 (2011) (order
appointing amicus curiae). On the same day the Court also appointed counsel in two other
healthcare cases in which it had granted review "in support of the judgment of the Court
of Appeals" concerning that court's ruling on severability. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 608, 608 (2011) (order appointing amicus curiae); Florida v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 609, 609 (2011) (order appointing amicus curiae).
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mandate.1 0 This Essay shows that, quite apart from the jurisdictional or
quasijurisdictional character of the issue presented by the government's
suggestion and the substitution motion, the government's actions and
Court's responses are quite understandable given a wide array of other
developments that have occurred.
While the Court takes no overt notice of the distinction, legal scholars have long posited that, heuristically at least, two basic adjudicatory
models-the case or dispute resolution model and the law declaration
model-compete for the Court's affection along a wide spectrum of issues. The dispute resolution model focuses upon the actual dispute between the litigants. The Court's task is to resolve that dispute. But, with its
emphasis on case or controversy, the Ashwander doctrine, the adequate
and independent state ground doctrine, and various issue forfeiture doctrines, this model has historically been underpinned by a premise that
significant barriers legitimately existed to litigant efforts to obtain judicial
review of the constitutionality of governmental conduct, and that the
Court should not reach out to decide legal issues unnecessary to the disposition of the controversy before it. By contrast, the focus of the law
declaration model has been on the courts, not the litigants. Its emphasis
is on the judicial role in saying what the law is, and it tends to see any
restraints on that authority solely in functional terms, terms not centered
on the rights of the litigants.
The usual approach is to treat the dispute resolution model as formally dominant, and then to explore the inroads made on it by the law
declaration model. But an examination of a series of what seem unrelated
holdings shows that this approach gets matters pretty much backwards, at
least so far as the "supreme Court"1" is concerned. 12 The Court has in
10. See Order List for the Supreme Court at 2, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 11398 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (order adding new parties), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/orders/courtorders/01 712zor.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) moved to add two parties after one
individual business owner challenging the healthcare legislation, Mary Brown, filed for
bankruptcy and closed her business. The addition of two additional business owners
sought to eliminate concerns that Mary Brown's changed circumstances had rendered her
challenge moot. While the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the NFIB, Mary Brown, and
another individual plaintiff-Kaj Ahlburg, who is not a business owner-all had standing
to challenge the minimum coverage provision, the government had conceded only the
standing of individual business owners like Mary Brown. Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.5,
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-398 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012) (discussing government's
position on standing), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/supremecourt._preview/briefs/ 1 1-398_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf. That
the government did not oppose this motion perhaps reflects an understanding that in
high-profile cases "if [the justices] want to find standing, they will find standing." Hurdle
for Health-Law Suit, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 2011, at A3 (quoting Professor Richard Fallon,
Harvard Law School).
11. The capitalization in this Essay follows that in the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 1 ("Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court. ...").
12. One does not readily imagine the government's suggestion being made to a court
of appeals.
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significant measure embraced the premises of the law declaration model.
While still formally disclaiming any general superintendence over the
conduct of other organs of government, the Court seeks to ensure and
expand its hierarchical superiority in our judicial system. Current doctrinal developments reflect a powerful drive to ensure that (a) the Court
can have the final say when any other court, state or federal, rules on the
constitutionality of government conduct; and (b) the Court possess wideranging agenda-setting freedom to determine what issues are to be (or
not to be) decided, irrespective of the wishes of the litigants. The first of
the two developments is, in the end, unlikely to generate much current
concern; but the second will raise questions along a wide array of lines
that center on whether such discretion is consistent with the Court's appropriate role in our polity. One interesting question concerning the second development involves whether legal standards or rules govern the
Court's newly fashioned freedom. Or is this an appropriate area for the
existence of a free-standing, open-ended, "all things considered" judicial
discretion?
With a focus on the last two Terms, the remainder of this Essay proceeds in several parts. Part I frames the general topic in terms of Marbu'ry,
Ashwander, and issue selection control. Part II describes the considerable
case law supportive of ajurisprudence formulated or applied in the interest of enlarging the Court's final say and agenda-setting freedom. Part III
turns to the thoughts of commentators, who address the question of the
Court's discretion in whole or part, ranging from Alexander Bickel to
current commentators, and finally all the way back to the important unresolved tensions between Professors Hart and Wechsler. Part IV explores
whether the Court's newfound authority in issue selection can be characterized as involving "legal" reasoning. A brief conclusion submits that it is
not clear what to think about these developments.
I. Or MAi3CuRY,AsHWANDER,

AND AGENDA CONTROL

A. Marbury
General propositions may or may not decide concrete cases,' 3 but
they do embody widely held (even if often somewhat diffuse) background
understandings. Marbury's declamation that the judicial "duty" is "to say
what the law is"1 4 is illustrative. Logically, such a "duty" need entail only
an obligation to determine what other governmental unit is charged with
primary or even complete law declaration responsibility. 15 But history
13. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 9 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Administrative State] (concluding "as a matter of
logic... the judicial duty 'to say what the law is' is analytically empty."); see also F. Andrew
Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1447,
1456 (2010) ("If the Constitution itself assigns the power to interpret to the legislatures
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gives a far more robust conception: Presented with a legal issue in a case
before it, a court ordinarily must render its own independent judgment
as to the content of the applicable law, particularly the governing constitutional law.
Although Marbuiy itself reasoned from "first principles,"'16 its reasoning drew quite straightforwardly from widely held conceptions of what
judges do.17 Marbuiy is simply the venerable standard bearer for the doctrine ofjudicial review, not its creator, 18 and claims of such authority had
occurred many times before. 19 The American doctrine can be regarded
as crossing into new ground, if at all, only in treating the Constitution as
"ordinary" law fully cognizable in the courts. 20 But that gave the
Constitution special bite: Marbury's "repeated emphasis that a written
constitution imposes limits on every organ of the state... welded judicial
2
review to the political axiom of limited government." '
The Court's law declaration duty has bounds, of course. Numerous
legal issues, including those of a constitutional dimension, never reach
any court and are resolved elsewhere. In Marshall's salutary phrase, they
and limits the authority of the courts to second guess those interpretations, the duty of the
courts is to follow the interpretation rendered by the legislature.").
16. Marbury reflects Chief Justice Marshall's opinion-writing penchant for reasoning
from first principles and eschewing already existing supportive precedent. See Lucas H.
Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American Elite, 1789-2008, at 69 (2009)
(describing "Marshall's usual approach of writing at a high level of abstraction . . . while
avoiding mention ofjudicial precedents").
17. When adjudicating common law or statutory claims, courts are (and were) under
a duty to fashion the applicable law from the legal theories offered by counsel-or, equally
importantly, from their own resources. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp, 487 U.S. 500,
512-13 (1988) (rejecting rules of tort liability for government contractors proposed by
litigants and fashioning own).
18. "Th[e] point.., for which Marbuy is famous... was hardly in contention." Powe,
supra note 16, at 48. For source references, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al.,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 68 n.3 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler]. The most comprehensive discussion of the historical
origins ofjudicial review is Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (2008).
19. This is the central theme of Professor Hamburger's comprehensive treatment. See
Hamburger, supra note 18, at 8 (noting view that judicial review was legal conclusion of
Marbury "does not make much of a dent in the history ofjudicial review or its implication
that the authority for this power came from the judges themselves").
20. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale
L.J. 1363, 1365 (1973) [hereinafter Monaghan, The Who and When] ("That the
Constitution [in Marbury] was to be applied as 'ordinary law' by the courts in resolving
claims of litigants was a marked advance, squarely rejecting as it did the view 'hat the
document stated only political rules beyond the cognizance of judicial tribunals."). Some
writers argue that the Constitution's full domestication as ordinary law came only after
Marbury. See, e.g., Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 4,
109-75 (1990) (tracing "[l]egalization of the Constitution" in post-Marbury Marshall
court). Professor Snowiss emphasizes decisions subsequent to Marbury that applied
ordinary common law rules of interpretation in constitutional adjudication.
21. Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note 20, at 1370 (citation omitted).
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present issues of "political law." 22 Marshall also observed that if the federal judicial power extended to every constitutional question "it would
involve almost every subject proper for legislative discussion and decision." 23 In addition to the questions beyond the reach of any court, constitutional issues that do reach some court frequently cannot be reviewed
by the supreme Court.24 Finally, of course, a case or controversy must
25
exist before it or any other Article III court can act.
Marbury's law declaration duty language was set against a second important understanding in our constitutional jurisprudence: The institution of judicial review was designed to secure the protection of private
rights. "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the fights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion." 2 6 As Herbert Wechsler expressed it:
The [law declaration]duty, to be sure, is not that of policing or advising
legislatures or executives, nor even, as the uninstructed think, of
standing as an ever-open forum for the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the Constitution for support. It is the duty
to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with
the law, with all that that implies as to a rigorous insistence on
the satisfaction of procedural and jurisdictional requirements;
the concept that Professor Freund reminds us was so fundamental in the thought and work of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Only when
the standing law, decisional or statutory, provides a remedy to vindicate the interest that demands protection against an infringement of the kind that is alleged, a law of remedies that ordinarily at
least is framed in reference to rights and wrongs in general, do courts
have any business asking what the Constitution may require orforbid,
22. John Marshall, Speech in the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 4 The
Papers of John Marshall 82, 95-96 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984) (stressing Constitution
does not vest in federal courts exclusive authority to decide "all questions arising under the
constitution, treaties and laws of the United States"; while such issues may be questions of
law, some of them are questions of political law, and must be answered by the political
branches of government). This reality has, of course, a range considerably wider than the
current political question doctrine. This fact plays a considerable role in the Office of
Legal Counsel's conception of its own role. That office understands that it exercises a
frequently unreviewable authority to say what the law is. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare
Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1483 (2010) (describing
how Office of Legal Counsel opinions are initially not public, thus not reviewable by
Congress).
23. Marshall, supra note 22, at 95, quoted in Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v.
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011).
24. E.g.Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev.
979, 1005-06, 1015-29 (2010) (discussing decisions on adequate and independent state
ground doctrine and defending desirability of nonreviewability in areas of criminal
procedure).
25. State courts and non-Article III federal tribunals face no such constitutional
inhibition.
26. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
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and only27then when it is necessary for decision of the case that is
at hand.
Thus, at the very beginning, two ideas were jointly present: (a) the
conception of a law-declaring judicial duty, very strongly set forth in the
context of ensuring limited government; and (b) judicial review conceived of as protecting individual rights, a concept in that era (and much
of the nineteenth century) that generally imagined litigants asserting
rights of life, liberty, and property of the kind secured by the common
law of tort and property against private interference.2 8 The rest of this
story is well known. In the twentieth century, the types of litigants who
could gain access to the Article III courts were vastly expanded, a development that Wechsler seemed to accept without question, so long as the
29
controversy remained over "rights and wrongs."
Over time, the two strains that can be traced to Marbuy have evolved
into what are presently characterized as the law declaration and the dispute resolution models. 30 The Court's jurisprudence does not formally
separate these models. Quite to the contrary, it merges them. For example, in Arizona ChristianSchool Tuition Organization v. Winn, the Court recently said:
In the English legal tradition, the need to redress an injury resulting from a specific dispute taught the efficacy ofjudicial resolution and gave legitimacy to judicial decrees. The importance
of resolving specific cases was visible, for example, in the incremental approach of the common law and in equity's consideration of exceptional circumstances. The Framers paid heed to
these lessons. See U.S. Const., art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity... "). By rules consistent with the longstanding practices of Anglo-American courts
a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the federal judicial power must
assert more than just the "generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance." 3'
27. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1959) [hereinafter Wechsler, Neutral Principles] (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
28. See Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note 20, at 1365-68 (describing
development of "'private rights' model" of adjudication). If, absent official justification,
the government official's conduct would have been a tort, the Constitution was conceived
of as invalidating the justification, thereby leaving the government official as an ordinary
tortfeasor.
29. See Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 6.
30. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 72-80 (discussing these two models and
subsequent supreme Court doctrine). Essentially verbal variations of this dichotomy can
readily be found. But the variation is only the labels. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen,
Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1-7
(1985) (dividing adjudication into "arbitration" and "regulation" models); Evan Tsen Lee,
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Moomess, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 603,
625-36 (1992) (proposing "dispute resolution" and "public values" models).
31. 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-42 (2011) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)).
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But current commentators, although they recognize that the models are
only heuristic devices that bleed into one another, tend to emphasize the
32
tensions between the two models.
Over time, moreover, understanding of the nature of the judicial
law-declaring duty has sharpened. It is now understood that a court need
not invariably supply the content of all of the applicable law. No such
doctrine could survive the rise of the administrative state. 33 Much of the
law governing the modern administrative state reflects a premise that the
core judicial duty "is to ensure that the administrative agency stays within
the zone of discretion committed to it by its organic act."3 4 Ultra vires
35
review, in other words.
Early constitutional decisions expressed conceptions that at least
bear a family resemblance to ultra vires review, often stating that an authority to invalidate could rightly be exercised only in "clear" cases. In
Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice Marshall himself wrote that:
[I]t is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the
legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,
and its acts to be considered as void. The opposition between
the constitution and the law should be such that the judge feels
a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each
36
other.
32. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 72-75 (describing "competing account[s]
of the courts" provided by these two models).
33. This is not to suggest that the current shape of judicial review of administrative
agencies was inevitable. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication,
and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev.
939 (2011) (documenting shift from nineteenth century models of review of administrative
action to modern "appellate style" judicial review embodied in Administrative Procedure
Act).
34. Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 15, at 33; see also Merrill, supra note
33, at 1002-03 (contrasting this conception with traditional appellate review model).
35. Such a conception is quite visible in step two of the Chevron doctrine, see Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984), the most recent
iteration of which appears in Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011) (applying Chevron in tax context). For a recent, brief, and lucid
exposition of the various justifications offered for Chevron in light of Marbury, see Note,
Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 2043,
2045-49 (2010) (evaluating four traditional rationales for deference to agency
interpretations); see also Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880-81 (2011)
(insisting on judicial deference to agency interpretations of own rules). For a more
detailed discussion of the history of judicial review of administrative action, notably the
influence of the appellate review model on the development of the modem standard, see
generally Merrill, supra note 33; Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note 15.
36. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). For an even earlier
expression of this view, see justice Paterson's opinion in Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Paterson, J.) ("IT] o authorise this Court to pronounce any law
void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication."). Marbuiy itself can be read as a clear mistake case: Congress

was clearly wrong to believe that it could expand the Court's original jurisdiction.
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And in his enormously influential article written at the end of the nineteenth century, James Bradley Thayer insisted that the Court could invalidate acts of Congress only on the basis of a clear mistake. 37 This formulation in particular sounds a great deal like ultra vires review, not
independent judgment on the "true meaning" of the constitutional
text.38 And, of course, ultra vires review resonates quite well in constitutional law with the political question doctrine,3 9 as well as with any stan37. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893) ("[The Court] can only disregard the
Act [of Congress] when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
mistake, but have made a very clear one . .. ."). As I previously stated, "Thayer's general
theory that judicial review was intended to restrain only plainly ultra vires governmental
action [has] proved attractive to greatjudges." Monaghan, Administrative State, supra note
15, at 7 n.3

5

(collecting sources).

Eminent writers, however, have rejected this view. In 1928, Charles Evans Hughes
wrote:
It is urged that as legislation should be held to be repugnant to the Constitution
only in clear cases, and as this is recognized as a principle of decision, a division
in the Court should be regarded as enough to show reasonable doubt. Plainly,
that suggestion cannot be carried to its logical limit. If it were, the action of a
single judge in the court of first instance, holding an act to be constitutional
would be conclusive, for is he not a reasonable man? Or, if that judge decided the
act to be unconstitutional, and in the Circuit Court of Appeals two judges agreed
with him, but the third dissented, should not the majority bow to his dissent as
sufficiently indicating doubt? We have similar considerations with respect to State
court decisions.
Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 239-40 (1928). Hughes's
analysis is itself by no means free of difficulty. A clear mistake rule might mean that every
court in the judicial hierarchy must make its own judgment free of the views of the court
below. Moreover, if the court is multimembered, division within the court is not relevant. It
is the judgment of the court and not its members that is important.
38. For a particularly striking modern example, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 658 (1966) (upholding section of Voting Rights Act against constitutional challenge).
The classic elaboration and defense of this kind of review remains Archibald Cox, The
Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199, 200 (1971)
(describing cases in which "although the Supreme Court purports to say that the
challenged measure is constitutional, in truth the decision is only that the measure does
not conflict with the Constitution given the finding or judgment that Congress has
expressed upon its subdivision of the ultimate question").
39. Indeed, Herbert Wechsler believed that the sole function of this doctrine was an
inquiry into whether the Court thought that the Constitution had assigned determination
of a constitutional question to another branch, and that few such examples existed. See
Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 6-9 ("[A]ll the [political question] doctrine
can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon to judge whether the Constitution
has committed to another agency of government the autonomous determination of the
issue raised. . . ."). Time has run out on that view. See Hart & Wechsler supra note 18, at
232-34 (describing Wechsler's "classical" position on political question doctrine and its
relationship to competing views). Professor Paulsen, by contrast, seems to believe that in
fact allocation of decisionmaking authority in Wechsler's sense plays no role in political
question cases. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret
International Law, 118 Yale L.J. 1762, 1816-22 (2009) (arguing "courts do possess full, coequal, co-ordinate, independent interpretive authority, along with Congress and the
President" over international law issues).
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dard ofjudicial review that accords deference 40to the policy or fact-finding
determinations of other governmental units.
All that said, however, Marbury, conventionally understood-that is,
as requiring independent judicial judgment on questions of law-has
41
taken deep roots in our legal order, especially so in constitutional cases.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, to take a prominent example, the Court, invoking Marbury, admonished Congress for attempting to define the substantive content of the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 That
task was part of the judicial duty, not part of Congress's legislative
43
responsibility.
B. Ashwander
Whatever the precise allocation of functions between the Court and
other units of government in determining constitutional meaning or application, the Court has in the past recognized that, in our Republic, invalidating (especially congressional) legislation is a serious matter. The
canonical citation is, of course, to Justice Brandeis's concurrence in
Ashwander v. TVA, 44 written in 1936. The Court, he said, "has frequently
40. For recent examples struggling with Marbury and claims for deference, see Brown
v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (applying strict scrutiny to state's
factual conclusions and concluding "[t]he State's evidence is not compelling"); Christian
Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
2971, 2988 (2010) (noting Court is "final arbiter" of constitutional constraints' reach that
owes "no deference to universities" when considering such questions, but also noting "we
have cautioned courts ... to resist 'substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational
policy for those of the school authorities which they review'" (quoting Bd. of Educ. of
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 484 U.S. 176, 206 (1988))). Four justices
challenged the propriety of any deference. Id. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting); cf. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) ("[E]valuation of the facts by the
Executive [regarding terrorist organizations], like Congress's assessment, is entitled to
deference.").
41. In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006), for example, the
Court invoked Marbuiy in rejecting an argument that it was bound by or should defer to
the International Court of Justice's interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations. See also Hessick, supra note 15, at 1457-58 n.48 (collecting citations).
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
43. The Boerne Court stated:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. [Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)] . When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the
Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be
disappointed.... [I]t is this Court's precedent, not [the Act of Congress], which
must control.
Id. at 535-36.
44. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
joined by Stone, Roberts & Cardozo, JJ., concurring).
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called attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress. '45 He then declared that:
The Court [has] developed, for its governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it
has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
46
questions pressed upon it for decision.
Brandeis then proceeded to describe seven such canons (three of
which in fact went to subject matter jurisdiction). 4 7 None, especially
Canon 7, "the" famous "avoidance canon," on which so much has been
48
written, were for Brandeis proxies for implementing "resistance norms"
49
or "deliberation-forcing" requirements, etc. To repeat Brandeis's words,
these canons were "for [the Court's] own governance." 50 They were, as
Michael Wells observes, designed to ameliorate the "friction between
democratic principles and judicial authority."'' S More importantly,
Brandeis's formulation makes clear that the canons were not conceived of
as involving any right of the litigants.
While Brandeis himself may not have believed that adherence to the
canons was indispensable to the legitimacy of judicial review, nonetheless
for him (as well as forJustices Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo) they seemed
to possess a dignity far deeper than simple admonitions of caution; that
is, they held at least a quasi-legitimacy status. 52 Such a view would have
been by no means unique. In a series of lectures given at Columbia in
1928, almost a decade before Ashwander, Charles Evans Hughes wrote
that: "The Court will not undertake to decide questions of the constitutional validity of legislation unless these questions are necessarilypresented and
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id. at 346.
47. Id. at 346-48.
48. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1584-85 (2000) (arguing "[c]ourts
are engaged in constitutional adjudication when they 'avoid"' constitutional issues and
canon erects "obstacles" to legislation that borders on unconstitutionality).
49. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992)
(suggesting avoidance canon and other clear statement rules "may have a legitimate role in
forcing the political process to pay attention to the constitutional values at stake").
50. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
51. Michael L. Wells, The "Order-of-Battle" in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L.
Rev. 1539, 1548 (2007).
52. Justice Brandeis's focus was on judicial review of acts of Congress, not state
legislation. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (directing his
analysis toward Court's determinations of "the validity of an act of Congress"). This Essay
does not pursue that limitation further, or whether in cases involving state law, the
applicability of the canons would be governed by state law. See generally Abbe R. Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120
Yale LJ. 1898, 1907 (2011) (analyzing jurisprudential issues of state law statutory
interpretation by federal courts and concluding "federal courts should apply state
methodology to state statutes").
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must be determined."53 Hughes so wrote in explaining that the maintenance
and success of the judicial review in our constitutional order rested not
on its entrenchment, "but on the quality of the men selected and the
restraintimposed by the principles which they adoptedfor the control of their exercise of the judicial power."5 4 For him, a general avoidance canon was one of
five such principles, and his other four clearly were of constitutional
55
dimension.
The following "rules" elaborated by Justice Brandeis "for [the
Court's] own governance" are most pertinent to this Essay:
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."' 5 6 "It is not the
habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary . . .57
3. The Court will not "'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.' "8
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of 59
And "the" famous avoidance canon:
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." 60
Carefully read, all the quoted canons point in the same direction: In
Hughes's language, do not decide constitutional issues unless they are
"necessarily presented and must be determined. ' 61 Canons 2 and 4, not
53. Hughes, supra note 37, at 36 (emphasis added). The closeness of this formulation
to that of Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 6, will not escape the reader.
54. Hughes, supra note 37, at 29 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 30-41.
56. Ashwander, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
57. Id. (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
58. Id. at 347 (quoting Liverpool, 113 U.S. at 39).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 348 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
61. Early references to Ashwander recognized justice Brandeis's concurring opinion as
an important, if largely uncontroversial, explanation of the Court's longstanding
avoidance practice. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the
Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 577, 632 (1938)
(describing Justice Brandeis's effort as "perhaps the most notable opinion expounding the
rationale of jurisdiction in constitutional controversies"); Harry Shulman, The Demise of
Swift v. Tyson, 47 Yale LJ. 1336, 1343 (1938) (calling Justice Brandeis's opinion "the most
elaborate exposition" of constitutional avoidance doctrine). Ashwander and its seven
avoidance canons also enjoyed lengthy treatment in the edition of Professor Dowling's
constitutional law casebook published one year after the decision. See Noel T. Dowling,
Cases on American Constitutional Law 36-38 (2d ed. 1937). While other
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Canon 7-"the" avoidance canon-seem the most fundamental. Their
more celebrated cousin can be viewed as simply a subset of those more
basic propositions. 62 In fact, Canon 7 may push in a direction different
from Canons 2 and 4. Application of that canon often effectively leaves
the statute a dead letter; by contrast, the other canons may leave the statute fully operational, at least temporarily.
What unites the canons is the Court's reluctance to declare legislation, particularly acts of Congress, unconstitutional. 63 The Court, we
know, has invoked the avoidance canon in recent decisions of importance. Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO) provides a striking example. 64 In an 8-1 opinion, the Court
invoked "the" avoidance canon to deflect a constitutional challenge to
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 65 Arguably strained statutory construction permitted the Court to avoid the intense political firestorm that a
66
(quite plausible) holding of invalidation would have created.
contemporaneous articles overlooked Justice Brandeis's avoidance argument-and Hart
and Wechsler omitted the Brandeis opinion (except to note its relevance to Brandeis's
skepticism on declaratory judgments) from their first edition-the supreme Court
completed Ashwander's canonization with its discussion of constitutional avoidance in
Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947). More recently, Brandeis's
understanding was also Wechsler's: Courts should consider constitutional issues "only...
when it is necessary for the decision of the case that is at hand." Wechsler, Neutral
Principles, supra note 27, at 6.
62. Canon 7 has been sharply criticized on grounds of no immediate concern to this
essay. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 78-80, contains a comprehensive collection of
the criticisms. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 815-16 (1983) (arguing avoidance canon
"create[s] a judge-made constitutional 'penumbra'"); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74 (asserting avoidance canon may at times be as great a
"judicial intrusion" as outright invalidation because it leads courts to interpret statutes "in
ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and . . . may not have preferred" (citation
omitted)).
63. Hughes's language was focused upon congressional legislation and thus
technically Brandeis's formulations are more encompassing.
64. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
65. Id. at 2513 (discussing Court's institutional role when judging acts of Congress
and principle of constitutional avoidance).
66. See also Perry v. Perez, Nos. 11-713, 11-714, 11-715, 2012 WL 162610, at *4 (U.S.
Jan. 20, 2012), where the Court's unanimous per curiam opinion, quoting NAMUDNO, 129
S. Ct. at 2513, said that section 5 raised " ' serious constitutional questions.'" But at the oral
argument the ChiefJustice emphasized that the "constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
isn't at issue here, right?" Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Peny v. Perez, 2012 WL
162610, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/11-713.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a normative argument
that the Court's approach was particularlyjustified because it was consistent with the (small
"c") constitutional philosophy of the Voting Rights Act, see William N. Eskridge Jr. &John
Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution 117-18 (2010)
(characterizing Voting Rights Act as "classic example of a superstatute" that "propounded
a bold new principle of law"). The late Professor Frickey went even further. He viewed
Canon 7 as ajudicial mechanism for self-defense, and thought that it could be employed to
contradict plain meaning. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The
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C. Agenda Control
With the 2009 and 2010 Court Terms as its special focus, this Essay
examines one facet of the 'Judicial duty": the role of discretion when the
Court decides what to decide. This Essay submits that the Court's jurisprudence seems to rest upon two important and mutually reinforcing impulses designed to reinforce the Court's hierarchical supremacy within
the judicial system 6 7 : First, "final say." The Court continues to piously disclaim any general, freestanding superintendence role over other organs
of government; 68 but if another court makes such a claim-that is, another court has passed on an issue of federal constitutional law regulating
the conduct of public officials-the Court believes that it should be able
to review that ruling, and it fashions doctrine towards that end. 69 Second,
"agenda selection freedom." The Court seeks as much freedom as possible over what is to be finally and authoritatively decided.
In implementing these deep impulses, the Court has considerably
70
relaxed the historical Article III barriers of standing and mootness. Current doctrine effectively excludes on constitutional grounds only ideological litigants, most (but not all) cranks, and (more troublingly) many
"beneficiaries" of governmental programs. Moreover, the Court is adroit
at reading jurisdiction-stripping statutes out of existence. 7 1 After it gained
discretionary control over whether to review state courtjudgments, it softAvoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the
Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397, 459-61 (2005) (discussing application of
avoidance canon to promote "underenforced constitutional norms").
For other examples of the invocation of the avoidance canon, see Dep't of Commerce
v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343-44 (1999) (deciding case on statutory
grounds and finding it "unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue presented"); United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985) (discussing avoidance canon). But, unsurprisingly,
the Court also tells us that the canon cannot be used to distort the clear meaning of a
statute. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2605 (2011) ("In this case, we do not think
the plain text. . . leaves any room for the canon of avoidance."); Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) ("It is therefore clear that plaintiffs are asking us
not to interpret [the statute], but to revise it.").
67. See also Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C.
L. Rev. 847, 935 (2005) (arguing Court's "authorization of unnecessary constitutional
rulings can be understood as part of larger trend in which the Court has asserted its
supremacy over the other branches of government and has come to see its primary role as
the declaration of constitutional norms rather than the resolution of ordinary disputes").
68. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-42 (2011)
(invoking history of dispute resolution model in rejecting taxpayer Establishment Clause
challenge).
69. While the focus of this Essay is on constitutional law for ease of exposition, the
observation seems generally applicable to any important issue of federal law.
70. The relevant materials are collected in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 100-98.
They have been extensively discussed by many writers, including this one, and while they
are relevant to the thesis of this Essay they are not its focus and are not separately
discussed.
71. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1996) (holding Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act did not strip Court of jurisdiction over original habeas
corpus petitions). Yours truly was among the counsel in that case.
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ened the final judgment requirement of the governing statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257, so as to minimize the possibility of state court constitutional rulings that could escape its inspection. 72 For much the same reason,
Camreta v. Greene allowed successful official immunity holders to seek review of circuit court holdings that their conduct had violated constitutional norms.7 3 Less noticeably perhaps, but in fact of great importance,
the Court rather freely injects issues into cases, adding questions and, in
the same vein, often appointing amici to defend the judgment below
even though no litigant has chosen to continue the fight, let alone present the issue. 7 4 And, despite the belief that the Court's issue-forfeiture
rules (waivers, stipulations, concessions) bind it as well as the litigants,
these doctrines are frequently employed to enlarge (not restrict) its abil75
ity to avoid avoidance.
While the Court has not articulated a coherent explanation orjustification for its current avoiding-avoidance practices, 76 what unites them is
clear: Because the Court stands hierarchically at the head of the federal
legal order, it is charged with its superintendence in order to ensure coherence, unity, stability, and orderly law development. On that recognition, the Court increasingly sees its core responsibility as that of law declaration. Put differently, the Court sees its "essential role," to borrow Henry
Hart's famous phrase, 77 as law declaration, not dispute resolution. As
such, it displays impatience with doctrines that limit its authority in that
respect, especially so when the result would deny its review of the decisions of other courts on issues of systemic constitutional importance.
These developments, I would emphasize, involve the prerogatives of the
supreme Court only, not of other courts; and, even more importantly, no
concern with the "rights" of the litigants drives the Court's thinking.
The Court is moving, not linearly, but noticeably, towards ajurisprudence in which only a relaxed case or controversy doctrine, a weakened
final judgment rule, and the adequate and independent state ground
doctrine restrict the Court's authority to fully and effectively superintend
72. A parallel development occurred with respect to the collateral order doctrine. See
infra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that, under collateral order doctrine, lawbased denials of claims of official immunity are immediately appealable).
73. See 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028-33 (2011) (noting departure from Court's "usual rule
pertaining to prevailing parties" because circuit court constitutional law decisions in
official immunity cases "create[] law that governs .. .behavior").
74. See infra notes 121-155 and accompanying text (discussing agenda control
through issue injection and appointment of amici to defend judgments).
75. Parallel and reinforcing developments appear in the nonconstitutional context as
well, which are noted in this Essay. See infra notes 156-164 and accompanying text
(discussing nonconstitutional cases in which Court refused to recognize issues raised for
first time in respondents' merits briefs).
76. Unsurprisingly, issues of this character often barely appear on the media radar
screen, because they are often smuggled into terse footnotes.

77. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953) [hereinafter Hart,
Exercise in Dialectic].
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the judicial system on matters of federal law. Towards that end, the Court
insists upon having a final say as well as a broad discretion as to agenda
selection. This second development is more troublesome because it also
allows the Court to alter the very disputes that are presented to it for
resolution. But, quite arguably, it also allows the Court, which operates at
the intersection between law and politics, to accommodate more readily
the manifold pressures on it-such as law development and the play of
"politics," grandly conceived-as well as the inescapable human dimensions present in any system of adjudication.
In this jurisprudential scheme the Ashwander avoidance canons cannot ultimately be seen as genuine constraints on the process of constitutional adjudication, if in fact they ever were. For the Court, avoidance vel
non has become simply a question of judicial discretion, not quasilegitimacy. 78 Moreover, Ashwander itself was designed to avoid declarations of unconstitutionality. Current doctrine exhibits no such bias, avoiding avoidance is often used in order to sustain the constitutionality of
legislation. Not surprisingly, therefore, as this Essay shows in many contexts, a rather robust avoiding-avoidance practice has emerged.
I do not want to overclaim on the evidence. Of course, agenda control is not a new phenomenon. It may be, as Tom Lee suggests, simply
that the tools have changed-what we now see are tools much more familiar to lawyers, such as the use of forfeiture rules and stipulations. But
my impressions are that the intensity of practice has increased, even if
there is no epistemic break with the past. The causes of that increase are
of course partly historical, particularly the changed nature of the court's
docket. 79 My colleagues Peter Strauss and Tom Merrill observe that the
78. I put to the side the Ashwander canons-not canon-in the state law context. My
colleague, Abbe Gluck, argues in her pathbreaking article that state law rules of
construction bind federal courts in ascertaining the meaning of state law in federal court
and this includes any state law-rooted Ashwander doctrine. See Gluck, supra note 52, at
1990 ("[T]he normative and doctrinal underpinnings of Erie, together with the way in
which courts already treat analogous methodologies, point to the conclusion that federal
courts should apply state statutory interpretation methodology to state statutory
questions ....").By implication, she argues that there is no independent federal basis for
application of an Ashwander doctrine if the relevant state law does not does not sanction it.
The arguments are powerfully made, but it is not necessary for the purposes of this Essay to
further explore them.
79. Brandeis and Hughes wrote at a time when the Court was asked to restrain
governmental efforts to limit shape of the economic order and its perceived social
byproducts, such as unemployment and old age. Those days are now long gone, of course.
For a recent and engaging retelling, see generally Burt Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution
(2009) (painting nice portraits of players involved in court-packing fight). And after the
Court handed down its race discrimination and early voting rights rulings, the Court has
receded into the governmental background. It is now truly "the least dangerous" branch,
The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), at least
politically speaking, even if one cannot go so far as to consign it to virtual irrelevancy as so
discerning a critic as Fred Schauer recently did. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme
Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 44 (2006) (concluding "[f]or most of the highly salient issues of modern times, the
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increase may be the result of the decline in the Court's workload. In the
mid-1980s, the Court was still deciding about 150 cases a year; it is now
down to the low 80s.80 It would not be unnatural for the Court to search
for vehicles that would facilitate its ability to engage in meaningful law
declaration. And, as Jamal Greene observes, that search would be aided
and abetted by their law clerks (particularly the pool clerks) whose natural instincts would focus on petitions that might be good vehicles for important statements on the law.
The developments I have described and will explore in greater detail
seem new, at least in their intensity. But do they find at least an ancestor
in Marbury itself? Marbuiy said nothing about the nature of judicial duty
that was applicable to it alone. 8 1 Any court would have considered
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, whether Marbury had a right
to his commission, whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy,
whether separation of powers principles barred relief, etc. But the order
in which the Court addressed the issues has been a fashionable target of
criticism. 82 Relevant here, however, an avoidance canon would have
counseled against treating Marbury's appointment as having occurred
before delivery of the commission and/or the holding that section 13 of
the Judiciary Act authorized an original writ of mandamus. Had the
Court taken either route, it would have avoided facing the question of
whether section 13 unconstitutionally expanded the Court's original ju-

Court has been largely absent"). The Court remains an important instrument of
government. Major issues still flow into its domain. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011) (invalidating Arizona public
financing law); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (invalidating
massive federal court class action); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923, 1945-47 (2011)
(ordering significant reduction of about 37,000 in California's prison population).
Professor Matthew EX Hall's empirically oriented study argues that the Court's capacity to
change actual behavior is at its maximum when the Court's decisions are both relatively
popular and can be directly administered by the inferior courts. Matthew E.K. Hall, The
Nature of Supreme Court Power 5, 156-57 (2011). In any event, as the priestly interpreter
of our Constitution, the Court necessarily remains important: "Every tribe needs its totem
and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours." Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as
Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937), quoted in Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 353 (1981).
80. Writing in 2006, Kenneth Starr observed, "the Supreme Court's docket has shrunk
from 146 signed opinions during ChiefJustice Rehnquist's first year occupying the Court's
center seat to just 74 signed opinions during his final year." Kenneth Starr, The Supreme
Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1363,
1368 (2006). In the last term, there were fewer than 80 signed opinions of the Court, as
well as seven per curiams. The Supreme Court 2010 Term, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 362, 362
(2011).
81. Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note 20, at 1365 ("Marbuiy found the
power of constitutional exposition to be an incident of the Court's obligation to decide the
particular 'case or controversy' before it.").
82. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbuiy v. Madison,
1969 Duke LJ. 1, 6-33 (providing detailed analysis of Justice Marshall's Marbuy opinion).
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risdiction, as well as the need to proclaim and defend the doctrine of
judicial review.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, FINAL SAY, AND AGENDA CONTROL

A. Introduction
The traditional understanding, as Wechsler insisted, has been that,
like other courts, the supreme Court has no freestanding commission to
engage in law declaration or to superintend other organs of government.
The 'judicial duty" extended no further than deciding legal issues necessary for resolution of the dispute before it over private rights.83 (This is
how inferior courts routinely proceed: "The court, to decide this case,
need not reach the question whether .... ") But as a description of the
current supreme Court, Wechsler's world has become so distant that it is
hard to step back into its mindset.8 4 While still frequently engaged in
85
what we could regard as little more than ordinary dispute resolution,
the supreme Court's law declaration function has long since assumed
overriding importance. The Court has guidance and governance (super86
intendence) functions that no other court remotely possesses.
The Court has always been an important instrument of government.
Writing in 1835, de Tocqueville observed that "we shall readily admit that
87
a more imposing judicial power was never constituted by any people."
American history after the Civil War surely confirms his observation.8 8 By
the time of the passage of the Judges' Bill in 1925, which made a large
83. See Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001,
1008 (1965) [hereinafter Wechsler, Courts and Constitution] ("Under Marbuiy, the Court
decides a case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all within the purview of
the rule that is declared."); Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 6
(characterizing judicial duty "to decide the litigated case and to decide it in accordance
with the law").
84. For an excellent recent attempt, see Merrill, supra note 33 (tracing history of
appellate review model). And, of course, other writers like Caleb Nelson and Jim Pfander
could be cited.
85. See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2011) (settling, by
eight-to-one vote, meaning of Bankruptcy Code provision). This Essay counts cases like
Ransom-where the only importance of the decision, apart from its importance to the
parties, is that the law be settled, however it be settled-as dispute resolution cases. Justice
Scalia dissented from the Court's ultimate disposition. Id. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 33, 42 (1994)
(condemning "artificially unanimous opinions," and suggesting he will not sign an opinion
unless in substantial agreement). But it passes my understanding why he would convert
that dissent into a lengthy written opinion when no visible principle of statutory
interpretation was implicated.
86. This has been a constant theme in the illuminating writings ofJim Pfander, many
of which are now collected in James E. Pfander, One Supreme Court (2009).
87. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 130 (Henry Reeves trans., The Law
Book Exch., Ltd. 2003) (1838).
88. However, it was not until after the Civil War that the supreme Court assumed its
priestly role as guardian of the Constitution. Prior to that point most of the great
constitutional debates occurred in Congress, particularly the Senate.
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part of the Court's jurisdiction discretionary, the importance of the
Court's superintendence (rather than error correction) function was certainly understood. Just prior to his appointment as chief justice, William
Howard Taft wrote that the Act made clear that "[t]he function of the
Supreme Court is . . .not the remedying of a particular litigant's wrong,

but the consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the
application of which are of wide public or governmental interest." 89
Frankfurter and Landis added:
At the heart of the proposal was the conservation of the
Supreme Court as the arbiter of legal issues of national significance. But this object could hardly be attained so long as there
persisted the obstinate conception that the Court was to be the
vindicator of all federal rights. This conception the Judges' Bill
completely overrode. Litigation which did not represent a wide
public interest was left to state courts of last resort and to the
circuit courts of appeals, always reserving to the Supreme Court
power to determine that some national interest justified invoking its jurisdiction. 90
And this recognition has been the impulse behind every subsequent effort to enlarge the Court's discretionary docket. 9 1
The Court's current place in our constitutional order distinguishes it
in kind, not in degree, from other courts. That development seems to me
to have been pretty much inevitable. In the opening sentence of his
Columbia lectures, Charles Evans Hughes stated: "The Supreme Court of
the United States is distinctly American in conception and function, and
owes little to prior judicial institutions aside from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of law and judicial processes." 92 That realization, however qualified
89. William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of
February 13, 1925, 35 Yale LJ. 1, 2 (1925). See generally Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No.
68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006)).
90. Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court: A Study
in the Federal Judicial System 260-61 (Transaction Publishers 2009) (1928) (footnotes
omitted); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1919, 1962 (2003)
("The increasingly discretionary nature of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, symbolized by
the Judiciary Act of 1925, greatly intensified the conception of the Supreme Court as a
tribunal entrusted with the ultimate responsibility of maintaining the uniformity of valid
federal law.").
91. In 1988, Congress eliminated the remaining area of mandatory review of state
courtjudgments by making all judgments reviewable only by a writ of certiorari. See Act of
June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1257). For a recent comprehensive account of the evolution of the Court's docket
from an obligatory to a discretionary one, see Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari
Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 7-18 (2011).
92. Hughes, supra note 37, at 1. Some emphasis should be placed on "aside from the

Anglo-Saxon tradition of law and judicial processes;" otherwise the point is in important
ways overstated. See Hamburger, supra note 18, at 103-47 (tracing concept ofjudicial duty
in English common law). Hughes overlooks the importance of Scottish thinking and
practice in the initial development of American thinking about the structure of a
hierarchically unified judicial system with a supreme Court at its head. See generally James
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(and his own "aside from" qualification is of critical importance), must
play an important role in determining the nature of the supreme Court's
law declaration duty if that Court is to continue to be an effective instrument of government in our constitutional order. The Court shares that
belief.
This Part works out deep impulses connecting seemingly unconnected doctrines. But I do not wish to overstate the evidence. The path
described is not straightforward one in which the Court gobbles up appellate jurisdiction at every opportunity. 93 The Court has no institutional
need for such a voracious appetite. Instead, the Court increasingly desires
to exercise a highly discretionary prerogative to superintend law declaration by other courts.
B. Examples
1. Final Say Control Through Removing Access Barriers. - Camreta v.
Greene,94 of "avoid avoidance" renown, is itself but another installment in
the Court's Saucier° 5 jurisprudence. However, it illustrates that the Court
will not willingly permit lower courts to have the final say on important
constitutional issues.
Saucier had held that a court should first determine whether a constitutional right had been violated before considering whether the defense
of official immunity barred any damage action. 96 This, the Court reasoned, would promote constitutional law development on a case-by-case
basis. 97 That directive drew sharp outcries from busy lower court judges
who sought to avoid thorny constitutional law issues when the litigation
E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1613
(2011) (describing influence of Scottish judicial system on founding generation).
93. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-31 (2011) (upholding
unexplained state court discretionary decision to refuse to waive procedural default of a
constitutional claim as an adequate state ground for decision denying federal habeas
challenge); see also infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text (discussing Walker). While
the Court still expresses a preference for as-applied challenges, suffice it here to say that its
case law is not easy to reconcile. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 165-83 (collecting
cases); Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing
Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent
Election Law Decisions, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1646-48 (2009) (noting "preference for asapplied challenges," but describing doctrine as inconsistent); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial
Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738, 745-46 (2010) (describing confluence of asapplied challenges and severability doctrine).
94. 131 S.Ct. 2020 (2011).
95. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
96. Id. at 201.
97. Id. Historically, of course, concurring and dissenting opinions were the major
engines for the introduction of ideas generating law development or restricting its growth.
That role exists, but the role of a dissent in shaping the majority opinion should not be
overlooked. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 Minn. L.
Rev. 1, 3 (2010) ("On the utility of dissenting opinions, I will mention first their in-house
impact [in improving the majority opinion]."). Concurring opinions often are also
important guides for lower courts in determining what the Court has decided:
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before them was readily disposed of on immunity grounds. 98 Reacting to
that criticism, Pearson v. Callahan, invoking avoidance canons, converted
Saucier into a rule of judicial discretion.9 9 Camreta itself carried that process one step further. Once again invoking Ashwander's avoidance language, the Court suggested that the best practice was not to address the
constitutional claim.' 0 0 Nonetheless, the Court not only did not overrule
Saucier, it acknowledged that avoidance doctrine "threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in limbo."' 0 1 The result, Justice
Kagan said, is that:
Courts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to address novel
claims, fail to give guidance to officials about how to comply
with legal requirements. Qualified immunity thus may frustrate
"the development of constitutional precedent" and the promo10 2
tion of law-abiding behavior.
In the end, however, the focus was on the Court itself: If a court of
appeals takes up its Saucier option, the supreme Court claimed a superintendence prerogative. The Ninth Circuit had laid down an important rule
with respect to warrantless interrogation in the public school context,
and only after doing so did it sustain the damage immunity defense. The
Court held that the immunity holder, though victorious below, could
nonetheless seek the Court's review as a "party" under 28 U.S. § 1254,
apparently because of the deterrent effect of the constitutional ruling on
the official's future conduct. But the driving force was the role of the
Court itself: "This Court, needless to say, also plays a role in clarifying

The analysis throughout this book demonstrates that concurrences are the
perfect vehicle in which the justices can communicate their understanding of the
majority opinion. The concurrences that bracket the majority opinion provide
information to other actors about what the case means, about how far the
rationale can be extended to other cases, and about how much support the
rationale of the majority opinion has. Although previous literature merged
concurrences with dissents or treated concurrences equally, my overarching
argument in this book is that concurrences are not the same and that justices use
concurrences to communicate and to send signals to each other, the legal
community, and the public.
Pamela C. Corley, Concurring Opinion Writing on the U.S. Supreme Court 96 (2010).
98. See in particularJudge Leval's influential article. Pierre Leval,Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275-81 (2006) (criticizing Saucier
as "a blueprint for the creation of bad constitutional law").
99. 555 U.S. 223, 241-42 (2009) ("Because the two-step Saucier procedure is often, but
not always, advantageous, the judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in
the best position to determine the order of decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair
and efficient disposition of each case.").
100. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[O]ur usual adjudicatory rules
suggest that a court should forbear resolving this [constitutional] issue.").
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237).
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Ninth Circuit
rights." 10 3 Translation: "We are not prepared to allow10the
4
to make constitutional rulings that we cannot review."
10 5
Less than a week later, Ashcroft v. AI-Kidd reinforced that point.
The Court addressed the scope of its role in qualified immunity cases.
That immunity shields federal and state officials from damage claims if
either (1) the official's conduct did not violate a statutory or constitutional right, or (2) the right was not "clearly established" at the relevant
time. 1 6 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia acknowledged that lower
courts (consistent with Camreta) had discretion to decide which prong to
address. 10 7 The Ninth Circuit had rejected both prongs of immunity defense. A ruling rejecting either part of that holding would have sufficed
for reversal, but Justice Scalia said:
Courts should think carefully before expending "scarce judicial
resources" to resolve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will "have no effect on the
outcome of the case." . . . When, however, a Court of Appeals
does address both prongs of qualified-immunity analysis, we
have discretion to correct its errors at each step. Although not
necessary to reverse an erroneous judgment, doing so ensures
that courts do not insulate constitutional decisions at the frontiers of the law from our review or inadvertently undermine the
values qualified immunity seeks to promote. 0 8
Translation: Same as in Camreta, "[w]e are not prepared to allow the
Ninth Circuit to make constitutional rulings that we cannot review." Four
justices objected to any consideration of the first prong, which they believed presented difficult issues. Every member of the Court, however,
proceeded on the premise that this was all a matter within the Court's
discretion. 109 No rights of the litigants were implicated.
The Saucier developments fit nicely with the Court's softening of the
"final judgment" barrier of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (governing review of state
court judgments) in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.I 0 There, the Court
emphasized the flexibility of the concept, and its particular concern was
103. Id. at 2032.
104. There were two concurring opinions and one dissent, but only one opinion
squarely challenged this premise. See id. at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting
majority opinion's treatment of Camreta's right to appeal "does not accord with our past
practice").
105. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
106. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding "government
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
107. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Cf. Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) (upholding state court discretionary
ruling as adequate ground for decision and rejecting federal habeas challenge); see also
infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text (discussing Walker).
110. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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to ensure that important state court constitutional rulings not escape its
ultimate review.' 11 (A parallel development has occurred with respect to
the collateral order doctrine in the federal courts. A law-based denial of a
claim of official immunity is immediately appealable.)11 2 Similar developments occurred when the Court in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish held that state
officials bound by a state court injunction could invoke the Court's appellate jurisdiction even though the state court plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing.1 13 And, in Michigan v. Long, the Court held that state court decisions invoking federal and state cases would be assumed to have rested
on a proposition of federal law absent a clear statement to the
contrary. "14

All these decisions show that the Court is reluctant to leave important propositions of federal law for final disposition in the hands of judicial actors other than itself.' 15 Decisions such as this are, of course, fully
consistent with a law declaration/judicial superintendence conception of
the Court's rule.
Walker v. Martin," 6 decided in the same Term as Camreta and
Ashcroft, provides an illuminating limit of this case law. Like many other
courts, the California Supreme Court possesses a discretionary prerogative to excuse procedural defaults that would otherwise bar assertion of
federal constitutional claims. In considering the flood of original habeas
proceedings before it, the California Supreme Court often declines to
exercise this authority without explanation.' 1 7 In Harringtonv. Richter, the
Court had held that a state court order denying post-conviction relief
without expressing any reasons still qualified as an adjudication on the
merits under the provision of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), which requires federal courts to apply a deferential reasonableness standard to state court dispositions of federal constitutional
111. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 526-31 (analyzing holding of Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, particularly with regard to Court's concern that constitutional
rulings will escape Court's reach); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text
(discussing Court's treatment ofjurisdiction-stripping statutes).
112. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (allowing immediate appeal of
denial of absolute immunity); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (applying
same reasoning to qualified immunity).
113. 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(maintaining suit even though it was intrabranch dispute within Executive Department).
114. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (noting when "a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law" the Court
"will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the
way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so").
115. Cf. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2432-33 (2011) (rejecting argument
that Court's holding means criminal defendants would have no incentive to request that
courts override precedents). The Court noted "in any event, [our holding] will not prevent
judicial reconsideration of prior Fourth Amendment precedents." Id. at 2433. In short, the
fish will not escape from the Court's net.
116. 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011).
117. Habeas corpus applications could be filed directly in the state supreme court,
and after summary rejection, prisoners filed petitions in federal court. Id. at 1125-26.
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claims.' 1 8 But in Walker, the state court's practice was, in turn, challenged
as an inadequate state ground. 119 The Court rejected the challenge:
A discretionary rule ought not be disregarded automatically
upon a showing of seeming inconsistencies. Discretion enables a
court to home in on case-specific considerations and to avoid
the harsh results that sometimes attend consistent application of
an unyielding rule. A state ground, no doubt, may be found inadequate when "discretion has been exercised to impose novel
and unforeseeable requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law ... ." Martin does not contend, however,
that in his case, the California Supreme Court
exercised its dis120
cretion in a surprising or unfair manner.
This federalism-driven result strikes me as eminently sensible. Camreta
and others? Easily distinguishable, of course, because the state court did
not purport to render a holding on federal constitutional law that would
escape the supreme Court's superintendence.
2. Agenda Control Through Issue Injection. - Following the Judges' Bill
and later developments, the Court now has virtually complete discretion
over its appellate docket. 12 1 Strategic denials of review, for example, are
hardly unknown. 122 The Court has all but closed the door on any effort
by the courts of appeals to affect the Court's docket through the certification process.1 23 But even in cases the Court has agreed to review, the
Court claims a wide discretion in deciding what to decide. This is apparent
124
even at the grant stage. Limited grants of certiorari are common.
Moreover, the Court occasionally reformulates the questions presented,
and indeed sometimes exceeds the boundaries of the questions
presented. 12 5 More importantly here, the Court injects questions, even
118. 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (discussing applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2006)).
119. See Walker, 131 S. Ct. at 1124 ("The question presented: Does California's
timeliness requirement qualify as an independent state ground adequate to bar habeas
corpus relief in federal court?").
120. Id. at 1130 (citations omitted).
121. See supra note 91 (outlining evolution of supreme Court's docket).
122. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Declining Plenary Docket: A
Membership-Based Explanation, 27 Const. Comment. 151, 154-55 (2010) (characterizing
strategic behavior of supreme Court certiorari process). Seth Stern and Stephen Wermiel
reported an instance in which Justice Brennan advised Justice Goldberg not to vote for
review because they lacked a fifth vote to prevail on the merits of the issue. Seth Stern &
Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 197 (2010) (quoting Justice
Brennan as asking, "And where, Arthur, were you going to get the fifth vote?").
123. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1454 (discussing decline in court of appeals'
use of certification procedure).
124. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2011) (order granting certiorari).
For discussion, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1460-63. For a general but now
somewhat dated study of the Court's certiorari process, see H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to
Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 217-70 (1991).
125. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 502 U.S. 1023 (1992) (rephrasing question
presented by petitioner).
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constitutional ones that no litigant sought to raise. To take one recent
example, in M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Court's order reads:
Petition for writ of certiorari . . . granted. In addition to the
question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to
brief and argue the following question: "Whether Section 214 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President's power to recognize foreign
sovereigns."

12 6

Pace Messrs. Brandeis and Hughes, but no Ashwander concerns are ex27
pressed here.'
The most widely noticed recent example of issue creation is, of
course, Citizens United v. FEC. 128 After argument and submission, the
Court entered the following order:
This case is restored to the calendar for re-argument. The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: For the proper disposition of this case, should
the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.
the Bipartisan
129
§ 441b?
Who asked? Petitioner's constitutional challenge had been abandoned in
the court below, had not been mentioned in the jurisdictional statement,
and a (strained) statutory construction was available to avoid the Court130
injected constitutional issue.
Judicial issue creation-at least when the issue does not concern the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction-is far from problem free. It puts pressure on two related, albeit not identical, models of judicial behavior: the
adversary system model and the dispute resolution model,13 ' both of
which share the important premise that the litigants should be in control
126. M.Z.B. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (order granting
certiorari); see also Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S.
27, 32 (1993) (acknowledging Court's "'power to decide important questions not raised by
the parties'" under exceptional circumstances (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 320 n.6 (1971))). But see Sup. Ct. R. 14.1 (a) ("Only the
questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the
Court."); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992) (noting Rule 14.1(a) "is
prudential in nature, but we disregard it 'only in the most exceptional cases'" (quoting
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481 n.15 (1976))).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (order granting
certiorari) (adding Fourth Amendment issue).
128. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
129. Citizens United, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (mem.) (citing Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
130. See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the
Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 181, 182 (noting possibility of avoidance through
plausible interpretation of the applicable campaign finance statute").
131. See infra notes 302-324 and accompanying text (discussing recent commentary
on these models and issue injection and litigant stipulations).
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of the case.' 3 2 And, on occasion, issue creation bothers members of the
Court. In ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez, for example, Justice Ginsburg
chided a litigant for its "unseemly attempt to escape from [its] stipulation."1 33 She put her criticism in terms of the rights of the litigants:
Litigants, we have long recognized, "[a]re entitled to have
[their] case tried upon the assumption that... facts, stipulated
into the record, were established." . .. This entitlement is the
to be bound by the factual
bookend to a party's 1undertaking
34
stipulations it submits.
In Greenlaw v. United States,135 Justice Ginsburg once again expressed
similar concerns. After the Eighth Circuit had affirmed petitioner's sentence, it went on sua sponte to order a sentence increase.' 36 At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg questioned that action:
It seems to me that our system rests on a principle of party presentation as many systems do not. In many systems, the court
does shape the controversy and can intrude issues on its own.
But in our adversarial system, we rely on counsel to do that kind
of thing. So, my problem with [the court of appeals' sua sponte
to put an issue
action] . . . is what business does the court have
37
in the case that counsel chose not to raise?'
Ultimately writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg reemphasized the pos1 38
tulates of the adversary system.
3. Agenda Control Through the Appointment of Amici to Defend Judgments.
Interestingly, in Greenlaw itself, Justice Ginsburg overlooked the fact
that she had posed her question to counsel who himself represented no
132. Amanda Frost provides a lucid exposition of adversary system model in The
Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447 (2009), discussed infra notes 307-315 and
accompanying text; see also Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court
Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L.J. 1, 2-3 (2011) (criticizing Court for reliance on
legislative facts not tested by adversarial process).
133. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 (2010).
134. Id. at 2983 (quoting H. Hackfield & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 447
(1905)); see also id. at 3005 (Alito, J., dissenting) (agreeing "the parties must be held to
their Joint Stipulation").
135. 554 U.S. 237 (2008).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-34, Greenlaw, 554 U.S. 237 (No. 07-330)
(noting government had not sought such an increase by cross-appeal).
137. Id. at 34 (quoted in Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop
Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 907,
909 (2011)).
138. Justice Ginsburg wrote:
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and
on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral
arbiter of matters the parties present. To the extent courts have approved
departures from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the
justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigant's rights.
Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 243-44. Descriptively, her limitation is not accurate.
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litigant. 13 9 Despite the government's concession that the Eighth Circuit
was wrong on its sentence-enhancing statutory construction holding and
the government's suggestion that remand was appropriate, the Court appointed counsel "to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support
of the Court of Appeals' judgment." 140 That practice is now a standard
aspect of the Court's issue selection practice. 141 In Bond v. United States,
for example, the government partially abandoned a position on standing
that it had taken below. 142 After granting certiorari, the Court "appointed
an amicus curiae to defend the judgment of the Court of Appeals." 43 Similarly, in Tapia v. United States, the Court said that "[b] ecause the United
States agrees with [petitioner's] interpretation of the statute, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment below."1 44 The entry
for Pepper v. United States145 in the Court's Journal of Proceedings for
December 6, 2010, particularly caught the writer's eye:
Argued by Mr. Alfredo Parrish, appointed by this Court, for the
petitioner, by Mr. Roy W. McLeese, III, for the respondent, supporting the petitioner, and by Mr. Adam G. Ciongoli for amicus
curiae, appointed by this 6Court, supporting the judgment below.
14
Justice Kagan recused.
Beginning with Marbury itself the Court has, of course, heard many
one-party cases; that is, the respondent did not enter an appearance.
Nonetheless, the tangible interest of the party seeking review was clearly
at stake. 14 7 But what, exactly, is the basis for appointing counsel in order
to "support or defend" the judgment below? Litigants have interests; but
judgments? If the litigants have no actual interest in defending the judgment, or have abandoned positions taken below, what conception ofjudicial authority authorizes the Court to intervene? 48 While the Court
seems completely confident of its authority to appoint such amici, it provides no explanation for the practice.' 49 What does the Court's now in139. Goldman, supra note 137, at 909.
140. Greenlaw, 554 U.S. at 243.
141. For an extensive treatment of the topic complete with a taxonomy, see Goldman,
supra note 137, at 918-39. Goldman traces the modern practice to Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955). Goldman, supra, at 914-17.
142. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
143. Id. at 2361.
144. 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (2011).
145. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
146. Supreme Court, Journal (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov/orders/ournal.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Setser v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 3017, 3017 (2011) (appointing amicus "in support of the judgment
below").
147. Goldman, supra note 137, at 912-13 (noting frequency of "one-party appeals"
before early supreme Court).
148. I put to the side the indigent litigant desiring to proceed but financially unable
to do so.
149. See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 703-04 (1988) (taking
Court's authority to do so as clear). For a collection of the rather sparse writing on this
topic, see Goldman, supra note 137, at 911 n.28.
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grained (but unexplained) practice tell us about the Court's role in constitutional order?
To intensify the importance of the question, add the role of the
amici in enlarging issues before the Court. Standard doctrine frowned on
such a practice. 150 It is increasingly clear, however, that for the Court this
is only a matter of judicial discretion. 15 1 In Turner v. Rogers, decided in
the waning days of this last Term, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether an indigent in a civil contempt proceeding that could result in incarceration had an absolute right to appointed counsel, a ques152
But
tion which the Court then unanimously answered in the negative.
over Justice Thomas's four-person dissent, the Court reached out to
adopt the position of its invited amicus, the United States; it went on to
hold that the procedures actually used in the contempt proceeding were
unconstitutional. 153 (The government, I should add, now participates,
most frequently as an amicus, in about seventy-five percent of the cases
heard by the Court on the merits.) 1 54 The dissent against allowing an
amicus to enlarge issues runs several pages. Interestingly, however, like
the majority, Justice Thomas also treats the matter as involving nothing
more than a discretionary rule of practice.1 55 Perhaps even more interestingly, the Court itself devotes not a single sentence in the response to this
challenge.
4. Agenda Control Through ForfeitureRules. - The extent to which the
Court's treatment of litigant concessions, stipulations, waivers, and procedural defaults (collectively, "forfeiture rules") operates to give the Court
(not the litigants) control over issue selection may be underappreciated.
In each of the foregoing circumstances, a litigant has, intentionally or
not, surrendered some claim of fact or law. The standard assumption is
that the resulting forfeiture limits the law-declaring authority of the Court
in the same way that it binds the litigants. And surely that is often the
150. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2524-25 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
151. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994) ("Although we will
consider arguments raised only in an amicus brief, . . . we are reluctant to do so when the
issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal statute on which the
Department of Justice expressly declines to take a position."); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 300 (1989) (addressing question raised only in amicus brief).
152. 131 S. Ct. at 2512.
153. Id. at 2520. There were ten amici in the case. Docket, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.
Ct. 2507 (10-10).
154. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1338 (2010). For a brief
argument that the government now files far too few petitions for certiorari, see Adam D.
Chandler, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?,
121 Yale L.J. 725 (2011).
155. "[I] t is the wise and settled general practice of this Court not to consider an issue
in the first instance, much less one raised only by an amicus." Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2524
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (italics omitted); see also infra notes 170-180 and accompanying
text (discussing courts' treatment of amicus argument in Snyder v. Phelps).
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case. In Ortiz v. Jordan, for example, the Court refused to permit a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing a constitutional violation because of a procedural default in the district court. 156 In
Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation, to take another random illustration, the Court vacated a grant of certiorari to determine the scope of
tribal sovereign immunity when respondents waived that claim after the
157
grant.
On first impression these cases seem sensible and unremarkable.
The law-declaring duty is bounded not only by "case or controversy" but
also by the need to have a smoothly functioning judicial system. The latter surely requires rules with respect to the orderly presentation of claims,
including constitutional ones. But the problem is more difficult than ap158
pears at first glance. Consider, for example, the Case of the Turkish Tires.
There, the Court avoided a difficult constitutional question concerning
in personam jurisdiction. A unanimous Court held that North Carolina
could not exercise jurisdiction in a suit by the estate of two North
Carolina teenage boys who had been killed in an accident in France allegedly caused by a defective tire manufactured by a Turkish subsidiary of
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.1 59 (Goodyear, the parent, did
not contest personal jurisdiction over it.) Newly appointed appellate
counsel sought to defend the judgment by injecting a new argument in
the merits brief-that North Carolina was entitled to ignore Goodyear's
corporate structure in favor of a "'single enterprise' theory" that would
"pierce Goodyear corporate veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes." 160
Happily (for the Court, that is), this difficult argument could be avoided
because it had not been raised in the court below or in respondents'
opposition to certiorari. "Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention .... ,"161 The Court cited its own Rule 15.2, which provides in
relevant part that "[a]ny objection to consideration of a question
presented based on what occurred in the proceedings below, if the objection does not go to jurisdiction, may be deemed waived unless called to the
62
Court's attention in the brief in opposition."'

156. 131 S. Ct. 884, 890-91 (2011) (noting defendants had failed to renew their
challenge to sufficiency of evidence by appropriate post-verdict motion).
157. 131 S. Ct. 704, 704 (2011) (per curiam) (vacating with instructions to Second
Circuit to "revisit its ruling on sovereign immunity").
158. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). I owe
the title to Alexi Lahav. She renamed the companion decision in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011), as the Case of the Giant Shears. For the record,
Professor Manning objects to any levity by this author. Scrooge!
159. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 ("North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be
permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.").
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sup. Ct. R. 15.2 (emphasis added).
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Rule 15.2, added in 1990, does not purport to be a limit on the
Court's authority, nor could it. Suppose the Court had written the
following:
We recognize the necessity, even with respect to constitutional
cases, for the orderly presentation of claims. But we deem the
argument not waived. The constitutionality of judicial action
taken by a sovereign state is at issue here. We should be loathe
to hold such conduct unconstitutional unless we have addressed
every plausible argument for the exercise of such state authority.
On that basis, the arguments made in the merit briefs are properly before us.
Should the Court have taken this path? Even if the issue was a hard one?
Or should it have invoked Hughes and Brandeis and said that since the
argument had not been properly presented it was not "necessary" to decide it, even though the result was a declaration of unconstitutionality so
163
far as these litigants were concerned?
This Essay, however, is interested in a different phenomenon,
namely, how litigant forfeiture rules frequently enlarge the Court's discretion over issue selection; operationally, they often allow the Court to
reach constitutional questions that a majority believes should be decided.
The difference between the litigants before it and the Court itself bears
emphasis. Forfeiture rules are vigorously enforced against litigants. As the
Case of the Turkish Tires shows, respondents, for example, are routinely
precluded from advancing arguments in support of the judgment that
were not raised in their opposition to certiorari. 1 64 This allows the Court
to avoid difficult issues. Sometimes, however, the effect is quite different.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Forida Department of Environmental
Protection, for example, the Court refused to consider two arguments

163. Or, on remand, the issue is still open before the state supreme court, and it will
depend on its forfeiture rules.
164. See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2857 (2011) (forfeiting respondent's claim, which did
not appear below or in brief); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1151 n.1 (2011) (noting
State's failure to preserve argument). The same practice occurs in the nonconstitutional
context. In Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847
(2010), the Court again refused to consider an argument raised for the first time in
respondent's merits brief. Id. at 2861. Justice Sotomayor's dissent struggled mightily to
show that the substance of the argument had been preserved. Id. at 2868-69 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting). More graphically, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
S. Ct. 1325 (2011), a case involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court refused to
address an issue raised for the first time in the merits briefs. Id. at 1336. Justice Scalia's
dissent focused on that very issue as dispositive, and only thereafter did he argue that the
issue was indeed properly before the Court. Id at 1340-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Court can avoid litigant forfeiture through the plain error doctrine. See, e.g., Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242, 2244 n.3 (2011) (bypassing potential litigant
forfeiture issue and requiring "clear and convincing evidence" of patent invalidity); United
States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (noting Second Circuit's consideration of
argument not raised below is "irreconcilable" with Court's "plain error" precedent).
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raised for the first time in respondents' merits brief. 165 The result? Application of forfeiture doctrine eliminated potential roadblocks to Justice
Scalia's palpable desire to establish that the takings prohibition applied
to judicial as well as legislative conduct. (Justice Scalia failed to get a ma16 6
jority this round, and quite plainly he was none too happy about it.)
Snyder v. Phelps provides another nice example of how forfeiture doctrines empower judicial issue selection. 167 Snyder's state law tort suit
against Westboro Church and its several members arose out of the
church's well-known pattern of picketing military funerals in order to
maximize exposure to its antihomosexual, "God hates America" message.
Simplified, after a jury had sustained the claim for intentional infliction
of emotional injury and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, the district court reduced the punitive award. 1 68 In the Fourth
Circuit, an amicus suggested that the plaintiff had not established the
elements of the state law cause of action. 169 Concurring, Judge Shedd
agreed. 170 Citing Ashwander, he said: "Our judicial power to decide a case
is not limited by the arguments and actions of the parties."1 71 Recognizing that supreme Court cases had permitted some amici issue enlargement, 172 the majority nonetheless followed its usual pattern and declined
to address the issue, pointing out that the church had conceded that issue and so only the First Amendment was at stake. 17 3 Ashwander was put
aside in a footnote:
Because the sufficiency of the evidence issue was waived, the
Ashwander principle-that a court should not "decide questions
of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary"-is inapplicable here.... The resolution of the First Amendment issues
165. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2610 (2010) (noting neither argument appeared in opposition
paper and "since neither is jurisdictional, we deem them both waived" (citation omitted)).
The Court permits petitioners to raise new arguments, but not new issues in support of the
Question Presented. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 498 (distinguishing new claims
from new arguments).
166. See, in particular, his sharp criticism of Justice Kennedy, whom he may at one
time have had for a majority. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2604-08. Justice Kennedy believed
the issue was a difficult one; Justice Scalia, by contrast, did not.
167. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
168. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008), rev'd, 580 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 2009), afl'd, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Discussion of two other state law tort claims is
omitted.
169. Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at
16-30, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-751).
170. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring) ("I am persuaded that we should
consider the issues raised by the [amicus].
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989)).
173. Id. at 217 (majority opinion) ("Because the Defendants have voluntarily waived
any contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, we are obligated to
grapple with and resolve the First Amendment issues presented by the judgment.").
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is absolutely necessary, as7 4 it is the sole appropriate means for
disposing of this appeal.'
Surely, as it was conceived of by Hughes and Brandeis, Ashwander was not
a rule disposable by litigants; it was, as they said, an ordinance concerning
1 75
the manner in which the Court governs itself.
In the supreme Court, the concession went unchallenged.1 7 6 In a
footnote, the Court simply noted that the majority below had found that
the evidence point had been waived, and it then said: "Like the court
below, we proceed on the unexamined premise that respondents' speech
was tortious. ' 177 Moreover, when Justice Alito sought to inject into the
case the relevance of a subsequent church website broadcast concerning
the plaintiffs, it was rejected because the petition had raised only the
picketing issue.' 78 (This was a quite fortunate escape route. The protected nature of the website broadcast presented an independently difficult issue, as the ChiefJustice recognized.) 179 Thus, at the end of the day,
the Court was presented with a rather narrow constitutional issue. And it
held that the picketing itself was protected activity because it had occurred on a public way where respondents had every right to be; was concerned with an issue of public importance; and, in the Court's view, was
not directed at the petitioner. 8 0 Had the Court been faced with a differently framed petition, issues brushed aside could not have been
avoided-unless, that is, the Court was willing to do what Judge Shield
did: invoke Ashwander and examine the sufficiency of the evidence under
state law.
The important role played by forfeiture doctrine in enlarging the
Court's issue selection prerogative arises in many contexts. Three further
examples are both illustrative and instructive.
a. Concessions. - Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence in Salazar v.
Buono' s 1 (the Case of the Cross in the Desert) raises the question of what role
174. Id. at 217 n.9 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring)).
175. This Essay does not consider the relevance of state law construction rules on this
issue. See supra note 78 (discussing literature examining impact of state law construction
rules on federal courts).
176. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). Indeed, Justice Alito's dissenting
opinion made much of the concession to establish the outrageous nature of respondents'
conduct. See id. at 1223 (Alito,J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1215 n.2 (majority opinion).
178. Id. at 1214 n.1.
179. Id. ("[A]n Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context ...
180. Id at 1218-19.
181. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). Very briefly, the facts are these: In 1934 members of the
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), acting without permission, placed a Latin cross intended
to honor American soldiers who had died during World War I on a rock outcropping on
federal land in the remote Mojave National Preserve. The 1.6 million acre Preserve itself is
nestled within the vast (25,000 square miles) Mojave Desert, and over ninety percent of
Preserve land is owned by the federal government. Finding an impermissible governmental
endorsement of religion, the district court enjoined the government "from permitting the
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concessions (a litigant's unilateral forfeiture of a contention of law or
fact) should play in constitutional adjudication. Long story short, the
question before the Court was whether an act of Congress governing disposition of government property had cured an Establishment Clause violation.18 2 Four justices said yes,' 8 3 four said no.1 8 4 A three-person plurality ordered a remand. 185 Chief Roberts's concurring opinion runs but a
single paragraph:
display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve." Id.
at 1812. That decision was affirmed on appeal, and the government did not seek further
review. Ever vigilant in matters of this nature, Congress repeatedly sought to interfere with
the elimination of the memorial, inter alia, by designating it and its adjoining land as a
national war memorial, and then directing that so long as the land remained a war
memorial, the land should be conveyed to the VFW in exchange for nearby land owned by
a sympathetic private party. Id. at 1813. "The land-transfer statute provided that the
property would revert to the Government if not maintained 'as a memorial
commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring the American
veterans of that war.'" Id. (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2278).
182. The Court of Appeals had declined to consider the new legislation. Buono v.
Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We express no view as to whether a transfer
completed under [the new law] would pass constitutional muster, but leave this question
for another day."). In an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court,Justice Kennedy,
joined by the Chief'Justice and Justice Alito, said: "The statute presents a central issue in
this case." Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1813. It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on the
existence of the statute. Analytically, for constitutional purposes it should make no
difference under the Establishment Clause whether what the government had done was
pursuant to the statute or as by way of the federal defendants' executive response to the
finding of unconstitutionality. The only question would be the general statutory authority
of the federal defendant, an issue adverted to only by Justice Alito. But, of course, the
statute has psychological impact since it clearly put the district court and the Ninth Circuit
in conflict with the will of Congress.
183. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, thought that the injunction had not
been violated, and that the plaintiff, on his own allegations, lacked standing to complain
about the impact of the subsequent act of Congress. Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1824-28 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Alito thought no remand was necessary because the congressional
legislation represented a good faith effort both to comply with the Establishment Clause
and to honor the site as a war memorial. Id. at 1821-24 (Alito, J., concurring).
184. Justice Breyer's brief opinion said that the district court's finding of a violation
was an allowable one. Id. at 1842-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In a lengthy opinion, Justice
Stevens argued the act contravened the literal terms of the injunction, and in any event,
went on to say at length that it contravened the purpose of the injunction. Id. at 1828-30
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The final part of his opinion is given over to challenging the
reasons given by Justice Kennedy for remand. Id. at 1830-42.
185. In fact, however, only Justice Kennedy believed a remand was necessary, and
then only as a formal matter. His opinion all but directed the district court to vacate its
injunction. Justice Kennedy's opinion concluded that the act of Congress rested on a
secular purpose; and while he left open the question of whether the act created the "effect"
of governmental endorsement, he was overtly skeptical and thought that any such difficulty
could be cured with the addition of an appropriate plaque. Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J.) ("[A]
Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. It is a symbol often used to
honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient striving help
secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its people.").
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At oral argument, respondent's counsel stated that it "likely
would be consistent with the injunction" for the Government to
tear down the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, and return the cross to them, with the VFW immediately
raising the cross again.... I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government to skip that empty ritual and do what
on it. "The
Congress told it to do-sell the land with the cross
18 6
Constitution deals with substance, not shadows."
Quite arguably, this concession should not have been made. 8 7 For
our purposes, however, the question is whether Chief Justice Roberts
should have relied on the concession. One might say, "but, of course, this
is done all the time." Yes, of course, and that practice may be unproblematic when the matter before a court-even the supreme Courtis only that of a straightforward dispute resolution. 188 But should the validity of an act of Congress turn upon a litigant's concession? 8 9 To be
sure, in theory, that concession would not bind other litigants; the key
words here are "in theory." The practice sanctioned by the act of
Congress would in all probability remain in place until (if ever) a future
litigant sought the Court's intervention (probably unsuccessfully). 190
On the last day of the same Term, two highly visible constitutional
decisions, each decided 5-4, rested upon litigant stipulations (i.e., joint
92
191
the second, statutory meaning.
concessions): the first, as to the facts;
In both cases, the stipulations perhaps allowed the Court to address sub193
stantive issues that a majority was very eager to reach.
186. Id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1867)). The Chief Justice also concurred in Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J.).
187. Plaintiff could have insisted that remedying the constitutional violation required
fully rectifying all the consequences of the violation and that the act of Congress did not
do so. In dissent, Justice Stevens believed that the Chief Justice had mischaracterized the
scope of the concession. Id. at 1833 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. As noted, the Court continues to get its share of such cases, where the only
issue-of no great importance-is that the law be settled. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text (defining and discussing dispute resolution cases).
189. In this particular case, the concession would not have been important to Chief
Justice Roberts because he also joined justice Kennedy's opinion, which did not rely upon
the concession.
190. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History,
1988 Wisc. L. Rev. 771, 800-05 (describing impact of precedent on third parties and other
courts). Compare Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1821 (Roberts, CJ., concurring), with Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.8 (1976), discussed infra notes 309-315 and accompanying
text, where the Court refused to accept the litigants' concession that conduct having a
disparate impact triggered higher scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
191. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
192. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).
193. The decisions remind us that, if the Court is an "it" (which the current Chief
Justice works very hard to achieve), it is also a "they," composed of nine separate
individuals.
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b. Stipulations of Fact. - Christian Legal Society sustained against a
First Amendment challenge a state law school's "all-comers policy"under which student organizations must make available all offices to all
students in order to gain official recognition. 19 4 The Court rejected newly
appointed appellate counsel's effort to redirect its focus to the written
nondiscrimination policy in existence when recognition was denied,
which, counsel argued, was the policy that had been actually applied by
the law school. That policy would have raised significant viewpoint-based
constitutional objections, as four dissenting justices made clear. 195 Justice
Ginsburg responded: "CLS's assertion runs headlong into the stipulation of
96
"Litifacts it jointly submitted . . . at the summary-judgment stage."'
gants, we have long recognized, '[a]re entitled to have [their] case tried
The dissenting justices struggled
"-197
upon the ... facts[] stipulated ....
with the stipulation, believing that it was contradicted by the record. 198
Freed from the stipulation, however, they too had a welcome issue, a written policy that was in all likelihood invalid. Oral argument created the
impression that the Court as a whole was concerned enough with what
was the actual issue properly before it,' 9 9 and that a remand for clarification, the stipulation notwithstanding, was clearly well within
20 0
imagination.
Although Justice Ginsburg stressed (as she usually does) the rights of
the litigants, not the Court's prerogatives, 20 1 binding litigants to their
stipulations surely has a strong institutional dimension. Understandably,
appellate courts do not like litigants changing positions during the
course of litigation, and doctrines of waiver and judicial estoppel are designed to protect them from such manipulation. 20 2 Nonetheless, while
this is an important policy, it is only one among others, such as the
194. Christian Legal Socy, 130 S. Ct. at 2971. The Court concluded that the policy
constituted a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the school's studentorganization limited public forum. As such, this policy had been constitutionally applied to
a student Christian organization that excluded individuals who engaged in "unrepentant
homosexual conduct," or who held religious convictions different from those outlined in
the organization's statement of faith. Id. at 2980.
195. Id. at 3001-02, 3010-12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2982 (majority opinion).
197. Id. at 2983 (quoting H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 447

(1905)).
198. Id. at 3004-06 (Alito, J., dissenting).
199. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, ChristianLegal Soc', 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010) (No. 08-1371) (raising problem of stipulation but focusing on merits).
200. Id. at 37-39 ("So I have an absolute void in this record, which in turn I think
would be important to fill that void, because... with that great unclarity, [we are] asked to
decide a constitutional issue where I feel I'd need more facts .... ").
201. Christian Legal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2982-83 (stressing litigants are "'entitled to
have their case tried upon the assumption'" that stipulated facts are established to ensure
"parties will not be permitted to deny the truth of the facts stated" (quoting H. Hackfield &
Co., 197 U.S. at 447; 83 C.J.S., Stipulations § 93 (2000)).
202. "Sandbagging" the Court is thereby averted. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1423, 1428 (2009); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2662 (2011) ("It
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Ashwander-based policy of avoiding difficult constitutional issues. Christian
Legal Society presented such an issue. The Court was faced with a question
of the extent to which the state could refuse to subsidize conduct that it
could not compel. 20 3 The stipulation gave the majority the freedom it
wanted to weigh in on that issue. 20 4 There was no mention of Ashwander.
c. Stipulations of Law. - Free Enterpriseinvolved a stipulation of law,
not fact.20 5 There, the Court held that a provision of the 2002 SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) making members of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) removable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) only for cause 20 6 unconstitutionally impaired the
President's duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. 20 7 The 5-4
majority reasoned that because, as the litigants had stipulated, SEC members are themselves removable only for good cause, SOX imposed an impermissible second layer of good-cause protection between the President
and PCAOB members that prevented him, or anyone directly responsible
to him, from holding these members fully accountable for their
208
conduct.
The linchpin for this holding is, of course, the Court's starting premise: SEC commissioners can be removed only "for cause." The statute is
silent,20 9 but the Court of Appeals had previously so held. 2 10 In the supreme Court, however, no litigant made any effort to defend merits of
the circuit court's holding. Why? Because neither party wanted to make
might be argued that the State's newfound [statutory] interpretation comes too late in the
day.").
203. ChristianLegal Soc'y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
204. Justice Ginsburg in particular is deeply committed to sustaining the validity of
"inclusion" statutes and policies. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[A]s I see it, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between
policies of exclusion and inclusion."). This view of equal protection has stout support
among legal scholars. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Through Streets Broad and Narrow: Six
"Centrist" Justices on the Paths to Inclusion, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 10 ("The central
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment, after all, is equal citizenship."). For approving
commentary of Justice Ginsburg's opinion, see Pamela Karlan, The Gay and the Angry:
The Supreme Court and the Battles Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev.
159, 201-11. Karlan acutely notes the relationship of Justice Alito's dissent in Christian
Legal Society with his concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). Karlan,
supra, at 208.
205. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148-49
(2010).
206. That is, willful violation of SOX, board rules, or securities laws; willful abuse of
authority; or unreasonable failure to enforce compliance with SOX or board rules. 15
U.S.C. §§ 7211(e) (6), 7217(d) (3) (2006).
207. Free Enter., 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
208. Id. at 3154.
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e) (6), 7217(d) (3); see also Free Enter., 130 S. Ct. at 3182-83
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("It is certainly not obvious that the SEC Commissioners enjoy 'for
cause' protection.").
210. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 669 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
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the contrary argument. Rather, the litigants simply stipulated that for
21 1
cause removal existed.
Be that as it may, the ChiefJustice proceeded by summarily relying
upon the stipulation:
The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be
removed by the President except under the Humphrey's Executor
in ofstandard of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
2 12
fice," and we decide the case with that understanding.
That's all! This summary treatment is especially striking because Justice
Breyer's dissent devotes an entire section to this very issue. He begins,
"One last question: How could the Court simply assume without deciding
that the SEC Commissioners themselves are removable only 'for
2 14
cause?"' 21 3 He adds that the Court's premise is "certainly not obvious."
Justice Breyer points to Ashwander's second (not "the" avoidance canon)
canon. 2 15 Surely, the reader would not have been taken back if the italicized portion of the majority opinion, citing Ashwander canons 2 and 7,
had instead said: "But further briefing is necessary. We reject stipulations
of law, especially so where the result would bring to the forefront an important constitutional question." Oddly, in rejecting this route, the
Court's opinion wound up, much to the disappointment of unitary executive theorists-technically dicta, in view of the stipulation and the litigants' further concession that the Court's prior precedents were not
drawn to issue 2 16-seeming completely to accept the constitutional valid2 17
ity of the modern administrative state.
Chief Justice Robert's reliance on the stipulation was not out of concern for adversary system premises concerning the rights of the litigants.
Rather, one senses that his majority very much wanted to reach the issue
it decided. 21 8 Nonetheless, the ChiefJustice seems to have some explain211. Free Enter., 130 S. Ct. at 3148-49. On the litigant's strategy, see Peter L. Strauss,
On The Difficulties of Generalization-PCAOB In the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey's
Executor, Morrison and Freytag, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 2255, 2277 (2011) [hereinafter Strauss,
The Difficulties of Generalization] (quoting email from Richard Pierce on Adminlaw
listserv receivedJune 30, 2010).
212. Free Enter., 130 S. Ct. at 3148-49 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 3182 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
214. Id. As Peter Strauss points out, that issue is surely a substantial one. Strauss, The
Difficulties of Generalization, supra note 211, at 2275-77.
215. FreeEnter., 130 S.Ct. at 3184 (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 347 (1938) (Brandeis, J.,concurring)).
216. Id. at 3147.
217. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), points to the same result. The majority
opinion, once again authored by Chief Justice Roberts, also strongly suggests that the
structure of the modern administrative state, which has always heavily depended upon
administrative adjudication, is not in peril. See id. at 2620.
218. Compare Justice Ginsburg's opinion in ChristianLegal Society, which spoke of the
litigants' rights vis-A-vis the stipulation. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal.,
Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2982-83 (2010); see also supra notes
196-204 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Christian Legal
Society).
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ing to do. I say this as an admirer; his general consensus-focused approach to judging is close to my heart. He is strongly committed to
presenting the Court as an "it," not a "they" composed of nine individual
law offices.2 1 9 But consider two other recent decisions in which he wrote.
i. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the ChiefJustice sharply criticized the fiveperson majority for relying on a standing argument never raised by any
litigant or addressed by any court throughout the litigation, namely, that
state standing might stand on a footing different from the standing of
environmental groups. 220 (In fact, just as in Free Enterprise, no litigant had
2 21
a sufficient incentive to raise the issue.)
ii. In NAMUDNO, 222 as noted, the ChiefJustice invoked Ashwander to
endorse a (strained) construction of section 5 that would afford the petitioner all the relief it sought, and thus avoided addressing the constitu223
tionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
What, then, unites the three opinions? Given the intensely casespecific variables in these cases, I surely cannot say with any confidence,
and perhaps neither could the ChiefJustice. But one does detect a strong
measure of pragmatism. Even though the Court's opinion in NAMUDNO
badly wounded the statute on the ground, an announcement, for example, that section 5 was invalid would have created considerable public
outcry. And FreeEnterprise? Considering the apparent gravity of the constitutional issue before the Court, surely something more seemed called for,
given the traditional doctrine that courts generally refuse to be bound by
stipulations of law.2 24 Especially so, when the result is to bring to the front
an "important" and difficult constitutional issue.
Something more could have been said. Pragmatism may have triumphed yet again. While the Court technically awarded the President a
219. "After six full Terms on the Court, Chief Justice Roberts still has never been a
solo dissenter in a merits decision." Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term, 80
U.S. L. Wk. Sup. Ct. Today 3045 (2011). While highly charged 5-4 splits draw the most
public attention, last year there was "on average, 1.34 dissenters per decision." Id.
220. 549 U.S. 497, 539-40 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[I]t is ironic that the
Court today adopts a new theory of Article III standing for States without the benefit of
briefing or argument on the point.").
221. See supra notes 205-219 and accompanying text (discussing Free Enterprise and
litigant's disinterest in raising issue decided).
222. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009).
223. Id. at 2518; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing
NAMUNDO).
224. E.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) ("When an issue or
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories
advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply
the proper construction of governing law."); Anaconda v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 42,
46 (1944) (litigants "can not stipulate away" what "the legislation declares"); Estate of
Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939) ("We are not bound to accept, as controlling,
stipulations as to questions of law.").
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victory, it seems to have no practical significance, at least not yet.2 25 Moreover, in sort of a twist on Ashwander, the Court's constitutional ruling
avoided a perhaps more unsettling holding: Had it ultimately held that
the President could remove SEC members at will, that holding would
have destabilized a good deal of existing understanding about so-called
independent agencies.
Of more general importance here, the standard "not-bound" by legal
stipulations doctrine is far less absolute than might appear at first glance;
the Court, in fact, quite regularly proceeds on an assumed state of legal
affairs. In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, for example, Justice Scalia objected to the Court's reliance on the fact that the parties had litigated the
case on the premise that plaintiffs grievance and subsequent lawsuit fell
within the Petition Clause. 226 Similarly, and again over the vigorous dissent of Justice Scalia, in NASA v. Nelson the Court assumed the existence
of a due process right of informational privacy while rejecting the specific
claims on the merits; 227 it did so in part because the litigants had not put
the matter in issue. 228 Moreover, if a litigant consciously waives or otherwise forfeits a legal argument on statutory meaning, or the sufficiency of
the evidence, the legal effect is pretty much the same as a (at least partial)
"stipulation" as to the statute's meaning.2 29 And in Free Enterprise itself,
the Court acted on an assumed state of legal affairs when it refused to
reexamine the authoritativeness of its precedents on presidential control
of the administrative state, simply saying "[t] he parties do not ask us to
reexamine any of these precedents, and we do not do so."230
225. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting practical emptiness of
Court's opinion in Free Enterprise). But cf. Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing
Agency Independence in Free EnterpriseFund v. PCAOB, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2541, 2569-75
(2011) (discussing implications for future).
226. 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2011). Interestingly, however, he did not frame his
objection on legitimacy grounds, but only on assertion that the premise was quite doubtful.
227. 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2011) ("[W]e will assume for present purposes that the
Government's challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitutional
significance."); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (assuming right to
privacy while rejecting specific claim on merits).
228. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 757 n.10 (observing Court was faced with inadequate
briefing on important constitutional question). And, of course, the Court has now
abandoned any inflexible requirement that courts must invariably first determine whether
a constitutional right exists before determining whether official immunity nonetheless
barred an action for damages. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text (discussing
developments in Saucierjurisprudence).
229. Cf. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) ("'No procedural principle
is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,' or a right of any other sort,
'may be forfeited... by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal
having jurisdiction to determine it.'" (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444
(1944))).
230. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3147
(2010). Similarly, in Stern v. Marshall the Court declined to consider whether restructuring
the debtor-creditor relationship in bankruptcy "'is in fact a public right' . . . [b]ecause
neither party asks us to reconsider the public rights framework for bankruptcy." 131 S. Ct.
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The Court's actual practice is that the Court can (but need not) act
on an assumed legal state of affairs. 2 31 The matter seems to be wholly one
ofjudicial discretion. What seems decisive are institutional concerns, with
any litigant "rights" simply a subordinate factor in that overall judicial
calculus. But what are those concerns, and how are they to be articulated?
Should the Court have acted on the basis of the stipulation in Free
Enterprise, when four Justices (enough to grant certiorari) raised the issue? If so, what would the justification have looked like? I am not sure. I
am sure, however, that, unwilling to overthrow the modern administrative
state, the majority nonetheless saw an occasion to emphasize the (theoretical) importance of the President's constitutional role in the administration of government.
5. Agenda Control Through Choice of Decision Grounds. - Finally, of
course, the Court's issue discretion extends to the content of the opinion
itself. It is common knowledge that the opinion drafting process often
involves much bargaining-quite often of the "we don't need to decide X
in order to resolve this case" variety. These discussions reflect pragmatic,
23 2
not Ashwander quasilegitimacy, concerns.
In this process, yet another doctrine has now been converted into
one of judicial prerogative rather than of litigant right. Traditional doctrine had it that a respondent could defend a judgment on any ground
consistent with the record. 23 3 Well, perhaps not quite. The Court said
that it was ordinarily reluctant to go outside the questions that triggered

2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 n.ll
(1989)).
231. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323-24 (2011)
("Because [petitioner] does not challenge the Court of Appeals' holding [on statutory
meaning] . . .we assume, without deciding, that the standard applied by the Court of
Appeals is sufficient .... ); see also KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) ("Both
parties agree [on state law]. That question of state law is not at issue here."); Stem, 131 S.
Ct. at 2608 ("If Pierce believed that the Bankruptcy Court lacked the authority to decide
his claim for defamation, then he should have said so-and said so promptly."). But see
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). There plaintiff had challenged the statute
only "as applied" to its case. But, over dissent, the Court held the provision invalid on its
face, saying, inter alia, that a party's pleading could not "prevent[] the Court from
considering [the necessity of] certain remedies .... ." Id. at 893. Most importantly here, the
Court added "we cannot easily address [the issue of whether the statute would be
unconstitutional as applied] without assuming a premise-the permissibility of restricting
corporate political speech-that is itself in doubt." Id.
232. The evidence here is largely anecdotal, drawn from reading many judicial
biographies, such as Stern & Wermiel, supra note 122 (describing negotiations leading to
Baker v.Carr opinion). For a nice discussion and selection of materials focusing mainly but
by no means exclusively on Justice Brandeis, see Sanford Levinson, Compromise and
Constitutionalism, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 821, 836-42 (2011) (examining "intra-court
compromise").
233. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 n.6 (1982) ("Respondent may, of
course, defend the judgment below on any ground which the law and the record permit,
provided the asserted ground would not expand the relief which has been granted.").
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the grant of review; 234 that it is one of last, not first, review; and that it
235
ordinarily does not decide alternative grounds not addressed below.
But the doctrine has now become entirely one ofjudicial discretion. This
was made very clear in the last Term in United States v. Tinklenberg, where
Justice Breyer wrote:
As the Solicitor General notes, we may consider, or "decline to
entertain," alternative grounds for affirmance. In this case, we
believe it treats Tinklenberg, who has already served his sentence, more fairly to consider the alternative
ground and
236
thereby more fully to dispose of the case.
And in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, the decision concerning
minors and violent video games, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, would have held the state law void for vagueness. 2 37 Justice
Thomas, in dissent, chided the concurrence for reaching an issue not
considered by the courts below; but, again, there was no suggestion that
23 8
doing so was other than a matter of discretion.
Finally, of course, there is always the Court itself acting sua sponte.
Justice Brandeis's opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,2 39 overturning
Swift v. Tyson 240 is a well-known example. 241 So too is Mapp v. Ohio;2 4 2 the
question of overruling Wolfv. Colorado was not presented, and the Justices
initially viewed Mapp as a First Amendment case. 243 Other examples
could be proffered, of course. 2 44 And notice should also be taken here of
a related practice: basing decisions on legislative facts, often advanced in
234. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 n.6 (1996). This poor
soul got battered in the oral argument.
235. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) ("Because these defensive pleas
were not addressed by the Court of Appeals, and mindful that we are a court of review, not
of first view, we do not consider them here.").
236. 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2017 (2011) (citations omitted).
237. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742-43 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 2751 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
239. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
240. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
241. See Melvin Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 745 (2009); see also, Frost, supra
note 132, at 467 (listing Erie among "significant cases in which the Supreme Court has
raised an issue that went unmentioned by the parties").
242. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
243. Mimi Clark Gronlund, Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark: A Life of Service
201-04 (chronicling development of Mapp decision); PollyJ. Price, Mapp v. Ohio Revisited:
A Law Clerk's Diary, 35 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 54, 60-62 (2010) (describing evolution of Mapp
decision based on notes of Justice Brennan's then clerk, the late, great Judge Richard
Arnold).
244. Frost, supra note 132, at 468-69 (collecting cases). One of the best known and
most controversial decisions in this respect is, of course, Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967), where the Court based its decision on a ground that its limited grants of review (in
three cases) had excluded from consideration. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1460
(discussing Redrup controversy); see also infra notes 307-315, and accompanying text
(discussing Frost's view that "issue injection" is appropriate in limited circumstances).
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amici briefs, that have not been subject to challenge in the adversarial
245
process.
My sense of the situation, based on the case law as well as various
judicial biographies, is that Ashwander itself exerts little real pull on the
Court's decisional process. When issues are avoided, they are generally
avoided for reasons unrelated to any quasi legitimacy concerns.
C. Agenda Control and Article III
Finally, a word should be said about the developments just described
and Article III (and Due Process). For purposes of this Essay, Article III
must be understood against two deeply embedded propositions that are
in some tension with one another. First, our jurisprudence generally denies that litigants have a right to any particular substantive rule of decision. 2 4 6 This supports, if it does not compel, the proposition that litigants
do not possess an unconditional right to eliminate issues from the
Court's consideration of a case, and the Court does not violate Article III
(or Due Process) by refusing to be so shackled. Injecting issues does
nonetheless present additional Article III problems, since the Court is
now fashioning rules concerning matters beyond those provided by the
litigants. Appointing additional litigants-amici to "support or defend
the judgment below"-certainly takes yet another step beyond, at least in
the cases when no actual litigant wants to support the judgment, as opposed to instances in which the litigant cannot proceed. But the practice
is now too deeply ingrained to be overthrown.
Second, decades after Wechsler wrote, the Court still disclaims any
freestanding authority to pronounce on issues of constitutional law. Generalized claims of governmental maladministration cannot be maintained. 24 7 "In requiring a particular injury," Justice Kennedy recently
wrote, "the Court meant 'that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a per245. See Gorod, supra note 132, at 4 ("[A]ppellate courts often look outside the
record... turning instead.., to amicus briefs, even though the resulting factual findings
will not have been thoroughly tested by the adversarial process."). Gorod also provides an
extensive collection of sources on the role of amici in shaping litigation. Id. at 8 n.27.
246. If a case could be decided on any of several substantive grounds, the Court
infringes no right of the litigant in making its choice, even if that is ground not argued by
the parties. Redrup is one outstanding example where "the Court reversed three obscenity
cases on constitutional grounds not briefed or argued by the parties." Eugene Gressman et
al., Supreme Court Practice § 5.10, at 340 (9th ed. 2007); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) ("When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the
court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather
retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing
law."); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1988) (rejecting proposals
advocated by litigants and fashioning its own); supra note 243 and accompanying text.
247. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) ("'We have no
power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are
unconstitutional.'" (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))).
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2 48
sonal and individual way.' ,,
Current doctrine shows hostility to citizen
249
and taxpayers suits.
But the category of acceptable plaintiffs has been
vastly enlarged, a point law school students often miss when their instructors focus upon litigants who cannot sue. 2 5 0 This expansion has caused
the Court, on occasion, to cast the case or controversy standing doctrine
in functional terms rather than as ensuring that there is an ongoing claim
25 1
of right involved.
These developments are fully consistent with a law declaration
model. But that model has not and could not completely push out the
dispute resolution model. Standing, for example, is not a "best litigant"
rule. As then Professor Scalia wrote in 1983:
Often the very best adversaries are national organizations such
as the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union that have a
keen interest in the abstract question at issue in the case, but no
"concrete injury in fact" whatever. Yet the doctrine of standing
clearly excludes them, unless they can attach themselves to some
particular individual who happens
to have some personal inter2 52
est (however minor) at stake.

That proposition is still formally true and too much history precludes
now rejecting it. A live controversy of some kind must still exist. Simply
put, the litigation ordinarily must involve a claim of right; that is, a potential transfer, enlargement, or diminution of life, liberty, or property (all
253
three terms generously conceived) affecting a litigant.
248. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)).
249. Exclusion of a purely ideological plaintiff is a major premise in the cases denying
citizen and taxpayer standing. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing
Court's decision in Winn); see also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 114-22 (discussing
standing issues).
250. Insistence upon a Hohfeldian plaintiff asserting interests comparable to those
protected by the common law is long gone. Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note
20, at 1379-80. The Court fully accepts the reality that a wide range of nontraditional
litigants can sue. See infra notes 251-256 and accompanying text.
251. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08 (1962); see also Camreta v. Greene, 131
S. Ct. 2020, 2028-29 (2011) (holding Article III does not bar Court from adjudicating
challenges brought by government officials who received immunity below); U.S. Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1980) ("Gerstein, McDonald, and Roper are all
examples of cases found not to be moot, despite the loss of a 'personal stake' in the merits

of the litigation by the proposed class representative.").
252. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 891-92 (1983).
253. Cf. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1925) ("In passing upon the
application [for naturalization] the court exercises judicial judgment. It does not confer or
withhold a favor."). This is not a requirement that a coercive order be entered; an
unopposed declaratory judgment will, for example, result in legally defining and thus in
constraining or enlarging one person's liberty even if the litigants do not seriously dispute
the issue underlying the court's order. I put to the side the special problems presented
when the government is the plaintiff, see generally Edward A. Harmett, The Standing of
the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine Is Looking for
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Camreta v. Greene is intriguing in this respect. 25 4 The suit was a damage action against a state child protective services officer, and as noted,
the court of appeals had held that the conduct was unconstitutional for
lack of parental consent or a warrant, but that official immunity shielded
the defendant from damages. 2 55 The Court found that the official retained a personal interest in the litigation. With respect to immunized
parties, Justice Kagan wrote:
This Article III standardoften will be met... because thejudgment may
have prospective effect on the parties. The court in such a case says:
"Although this official is immune from damages today, what he
did violates the Constitution and he or anyone else who does
that thing again will be personally liable." If the official regularly
engages in that conduct as part of his job (as Camreta does), he
suffers injury [because] . . . he must either change the way he
performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action. Only
by overturning the ruling on appeal can the 256
official gain clearance to engage in the conduct in the future.
This analysis is, at first blush, puzzling, suggesting something like
preclusion or stare decisis. As to issue preclusion, it is surely doubtful that
an issue that is arguably unnecessary to the judgment would be given offensive collateral effect in a damage action by a different litigant.2 57 And
the stare decisis effect of a ruling has never been understood to preserve
a case from mootness. 258 Similarly, the fact that the official felt "chilled"
by the ruling has not been held to create a case or controversy, even
Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2239 (1999), or when one government
agency sues another, or there is an intrabranch dispute.
254. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
255. There were two defendants in the court below, but only one had an interest
when the case reached the Court. Id. at 2034 n.9 (noting "[b]ecause Alford will not again
participate in a child abuse investigation, he has lost his interest in the Fourth Amendment
ruling").
256. Id. at 2029 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). She added, "And conversely, if
the person who initially brought the suit may again be subject to the challenged conduct,
she has a stake in preserving the court's holding ....Only if the ruling remains good law
will she have ongoing protection from the practice." Id.
257. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2379 (2011) (Kagan, J.) ("A
court's judgment binds only the parties to a suit, subject to a handful of discrete and
limited exceptions.").
258. The Court has explained:
The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining
rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular
case before it. When, in determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an
opinion upon a question of law, that opinion may have weight as a precedent for
future decisions. But the court is not empowered to decide moot questions or
abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case
before it.
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893); see also United States
v. Juvenile Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (holding "indirect benefit in a future lawsuit
cannot save this case from mootness").
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where the chilling effect on private parties represents official governmental policy. 259 Unlike ASARCO, which she does not mention, the petitioner
260
was not subject to an injunction.
Justice Kagan appears to have focused solely on the litigants themselves. 26 1 This becomes apparent when she goes on to conclude that the
case, while alive as to the official, was moot as to the plaintiff. As to her,
Justice Kagan wrote, there was "not the slightest possibility" that the allegedly wrongful conduct would recur. 262 She thus ultimately brings her
analysis within the line of cases that focuses on the likelihood of recurrence of the conduct between the litigants, not to third parties. 2 63 But, on
the reasoning quoted, why should this matter? In terms of its effect on
the petitioner, Justice Kagan treats the holding as the equivalent of the

259. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) ("Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are
not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm ....").
260. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989), which arose in state court,
plaintiffs obtained an injunction against state officials on federal grounds. The Court
sustained its jurisdiction even though it assumed that the plaintiffs would have lacked
standing to maintain such a suit in federal court. Id. at 618.
261. The holding raises several questions:
Isn't the injury recognized in Camretajust a predictable byproduct of Pearson's
granting lower courts discretion to reach (unnecessarily) the merits of a
constitutional claim in a case that could be resolved entirely on qualified
immunity grounds? Is the injury identified by the Court in Camreta conceptually
any different from the injury sustained by a regulated party seeking to bring a preenforcement challenge to a regulation with which that party must comply at the
risk of incurring liability? From the injury suffered by a non-party when a lower
court declares some conduct in which that non-party regularly engages to be
unconstitutional?
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 7 (Supp. 2011) (citation omitted).
262. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2010, 2034 (2011).
263. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (describing "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" doctrine as limited to those situations in which both "(1)
the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation
or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action again"); see also Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. at 2865
(dismissing constitutional challenge to sentence served on ground that sentence had no
future effect); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2514-15 (2011) (rejecting mootness claim
because case "falls within a special category of disputes that are 'capable of repetition'
while 'evading review'" (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911))).
In a single footnote, Justice Kagan brushes aside the claim that the mootness holding
should have ended the case, saying "this Court has never held that it may consider only one
threshold issue per case." Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 n.8. Justice Kagan cites no cases in
support of this proposition. See id. And why the Court would address a difficult
"threshold" question rather than an easy mootness one is never made clear. Needless to
say, Ashwander is not mentioned.
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injunction in ASARCO. 26 4 And, notably, her holding wiped away the rul265
ing of the Ninth Circuit with respect to warrantless school searches!
III. ISSUE CONTROL AND THE COURT'S ROLE IN
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Justiciability doctrines (e.g., standing, ripeness, and mootness) struc-

ture, limit, and inform the judicial law declaration duty.2 66 For most
judges, lawyers, and academics, these doctrines are not understood as
simply masks used to advance political or ideological goals. They recognize, of course, that the precise content of these doctrines has significandy evolved over time 26 7 and is the subject of constant debate. 268 But,
like decisions on the merits, these doctrines must have principled content
269
binding both the litigants and the courts themselves.
264. And if that is true, an amicus could properly be appointed to defend the
judgment below. For discussion of the supreme Court's exercise of agenda control
through the use of amicus briefs, see supra Part II.B.3 and, in particular, the example of
Bond v. United States, supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
265. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2035-36. Professor Pfander's intriguing recent essay would
reshape thinking in this area, essentially allowing officer suits for damages to proceed to
judgment if the plaintiff sought only nominal damages. James E. Pfander, Resolving the
Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111
Colum. L. Rev. 1601, 1607 (2011).
266. Their propositional form readily satisfies Marbuiy, of course: In the
circumstances alleged, the court declares the law to be that the litigant cannot raise the
substantive constitutional claim.
267. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Who and When, supra note 20, at 1364 ("[L]ike the
substantive constitutional standards, the nature and form of judicial review were slowly
shaped over time."). The Court's current three-part standing test (injury, causation, and
redressability), see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444 (2011)
(laying out test), has no direct antecedents in nineteenth-century case law so far as I am
aware. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?,
102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 691-92 (2004) (concluding nineteenth-century Court saw standing
in constitutional terms, though less clearly than twentieth-century Court); see also
Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1131, 1139-40
(2009) (suggesting early competitor standing cases reflected view that Congress could
authorize private attorney general suits even if no private interest of litigant was involved).
268. For a recent article decrying recent expansions of standing doctrine as allowing
excessive judicial policy making, see RobertJ. Pushaw Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to
"Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Cases, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 1,
8-14 (2010).
269. See, for an example, Chapter Two of any edition of Hart & Wechsler. E.g., Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 18, at 49. For some, these doctrines are simply political and
ideological masks. For an unabashed subscription to this view, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741, 1742-43 (1999) ("Judges provide access
to the courts to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of
judges."). Others see these doctrines as insulated from judicial policy agendas. See Daniel
E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal judges Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical
Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 647-54 (2010)
(discussing political valence of standing decisions and concluding "our evidence shows that
standing preferences are distinguishable from merits preferences").
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A. Professor Bickel
For present purposes, suffice it to say that current doctrine (particularly in such areas as ripeness, prudential standing, and political questions) acknowledges some room for the exercise of judgment or discretion. But that discretion is, in principle, a legal one, a choice within
certain legal bounds.2 70 When Alexander Bickel published The Least
Dangerous Branch in 1962, he proffered a far different conception of the
nature of that discretion: The Court should be understood to possess an
apparently uncontrolled prerogative to refuse decision on the merits if
the result would uphold a law that ran against the grain of the polity's
"durable principles." 27 1 Bickel's argument drew a firestorm of criticism, 2 72 and I believe that it is important to identify just where he may
have gone wrong.
Beginning with a rather laboriously argued claim that Marbury's textual case for judicial review was quite wobbly, 273 Bickel summarily con274
cluded that the Framers nonetheless had assumed its existence.
(Bickel's lack of any serious interest in the actual historical foundations
of judicial review is striking.) Nonetheless, Bickel claimed that such an
authority remained problematic in our democracy (the famous "countermajoritarian difficulty"), 275 and could be legitimately justified only if the
270. See, e.g., Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1288 (2011) (describing, in context of
sentencing decisions, how law constrains exercise of discretion); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) ("[D]iscretionary choices are not left to a court's
'inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal
principles.'" (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d) (Marshall, C.J.))). It is, of course, old learning that whether or not one believes a
case is ripe for decision will often turn on what one believes about the clarity of the
applicable substantive rule. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale LJ.517, 532 (1966) (discussing opinions in Adler
v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), wherein justices disagreed about clarity of New York's
Feinberg Law).
271. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 127-33 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch]
(describing importance of Court's ability to refuse decision as stemming from influence on
societal principles its decisions have).
272. See infra note 275 (discussing opposition to counter-majoritarian difficulty).
273. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 271, at 1-14 ("I have tried to show
the purpose around which Marshall organized his argument does not necessarily emerge
from the text.").
274. Id. at 15 ("[T]he Framers of the Constitution specifically, if tactily, expected the
federal courts would assume a power ... to pass on the constitutionality of the actions of
Congress and the President, as well as of the several states.").
275. Id. at 16-23 ("The root of difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system."). A large body of literature discounts the
countermajoritarian difficulty. See generally Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen
Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 415-16 & n.205 (2011)
(collecting sources). This is not the occasion to engage in a discussion of that issue, but
this body of work seems to underestimate it both empirically and normatively. For a
splendid examination of the issue, see generally Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a
"Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 103, 158 (tracing lineage of
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Court discharged a role for which it is uniquely suited. Happily, such a
role did exist: the Court's special capacity to ascertain, declare, and enforce the polity's fundamental enduring principles. 27 6 Here, he followed
his famous teacher, Henry Hart:
Thus, as Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr., has written, and as surely
most of the profession and of informed laity believe . . . the
Court appears "predestined in the long run, not only by the
thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard
facts of its position in the structure of American institutions, to be
a voice of reason, charged with the creativefunction of discerningafresh
and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable
principles ....-277
While, like Hart (and Wechsler), Bickel fully agreed that decisions
on the merits must be adequately principled, 278 he departed from the
apostolic faith when he argued that justiciability doctrine need not be.
Why not? Because judicial review had an important byproduct: a "legitimating" function. Bickel understood "legitimating," however, not as lawyers generally understand the term; that is, as judicial confirmation that
2 79
the statute, ordinance, or rule falls within authority validly conferred.
Rather, he meant it as Charles Black had employed it-legitimating in a
popular sense, 28 0 legitimating as in some sense "good" or "desirable."
[T] he Supreme Court as a legitimating force in society also casts
a less palpable yet larger spell.
Quite aside from the Court's mystic spell, how could it not make
a difference in a society committed to principle as well as to
countermajoritarian and majoritarian literature and concluding, "despite the best efforts
of modern majoritarian theorists, Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty endures").
276. Bickel was strangely silent about the implications of his view forjudicial review in
the separation of powers and the federalism contexts.
277. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 271, at 27 (emphasis added)
(quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 99 (1959)).
278. Cf. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 15 ("[T]he main constituent
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect
to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite
transcending the immediate result that is achieved.").
279. This is an indispensable function of judicial review even (perhaps even more so)
outside the area of constitutional law. "The availability of judicial review is the necessary
condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid." Louis L.Jaffe,Judicial Control of Administrative
Action 320 (1965).
280. Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Court 34-47 (1960). Black and Bickel
were concerned with popular reaction to supreme Court decisions. Hart and Wechsler
were concerned with the reaction of first-class lawyers. E.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
84, 101 (1959) [hereinafter Hart, Time Chart] ("[T]hese failures are threatening to
undermine the professional respect of first-rate lawyers for the incumbent Justices of the
Court ....").
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electoral responsibility that28 1a measure is authoritatively said not
to conflict with principle?
For Bickel, if the Court were to defend adequately the polity's enduring
principles, it must be slow to accord its nihil obstat to "technically" constitutional but principle-infringing governmental conduct.
How, then, should the Court proceed? Invoking Ashwander, by being
alert to the "passive virtues" of not deciding: "For Brandeis. . . the mediat28 2
ing techniques of 'not doing' were 'the most important thing we do."'
Accordingly, Bickel argued, the Court could (and must) employ denial of
review and the justiciability doctrines in a discretionary, prudential, strategic manner.
It follows that the techniques and allied devices for staying the
Court's hand, as is avowedly true at least of certiorari, cannot
themselves be principled in the sense in which we have a right to
expect adjudications on the merits to be principled. They mark
the point at which the Court gives the electoral institutions their head
and itself stays out of politics, and there is nothing paradoxical
in finding that here is where the Court is most a political
animal.283
Bickel's claim of a judicial prerogative to manipulate jurisdictional
doctrine so as to deny the assertion of jurisdiction which is given drew
intense fire. 28 4 It amounted to a claim that the Court could act lawlessly
with respect to the Court's jurisdictional doctrines (for example, case or
controversy, adequate state ground, etc.). 2 85 This conclusion was anathema to the People of the Book, who, after all, had themselves spent many
hard seminary hours at Harvard, Columbia, and other such institutions
mastering these doctrines. 28 6 (Hart taught federal courts at noon on
Fridays and Saturdays; it was affectionately known as Darkness at Noon
when I was there.) Bickel's thesis meant, said the late Professor Gunther,
"the 100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time. '28 7
Bickel's argument never gained formal traction. The standard treatments still remain efforts to domesticate the various doctrines in a principled manner. 288 What then can we learn from Bickel? One need not sub281. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 271, at 29-33, 130.
282. Id. at 112.
283. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 127-33.
285. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1964) ("Bickel's
prescription for the ultimate disposition of the case after the grant of certiorari is not
merely bad but lawless judgment.").
286. But not at Yale, I can assure the reader.
287. Gunther, supra note 285, at 3. When Bickel wrote, the Court had considerably
more jurisdiction of a mandatory nature than now exists. See supra notes 89-91 and
accompanying text (discussing reactions to passage of Judges' Bill in 1925).
288. See Chapter Two of any edition of Hart & Wechsler, and Chapter Five of the first
four editions. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 650-55 (4th ed. 1996). To be sure,
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scribe to the mindset of the denizens who occupy political science
departments to recognize, as law professors always have, that the Court
has an inescapably "political"-political in the large sense-dimension. 28 9 How could it be otherwise? Constitutional law operates at the intersection of law and the political order, and this necessarily means that
the supreme Court is an important instrument of government.
Bickel understood this. His own efforts to deal with that fact present
two difficulties. The first is one of substantive constitutional theory, and it
centers on Bickel's claim that the Court's special mandate is to discern
and articulate the republic's fundamental enduring values. Arguably, that
search inevitably results only in a voyage ofjudicial self-discovery, not con291
stitutional interpretation. 290 This objection, to my mind, is persuasive;
nonetheless, I recognize that this strain of thinking likely can never be
exorcised from our constitutional jurisprudence. Many, including members of the Court, essentially espouse that view. Justice Brennan, for example, believed that the Court was charged with "keep[ing] the community true to its own fundamental principles." 29 2 Interestingly, Wechsler
said much the same thing:
I cannot find it in my heart to regret that interpretation did not
ground itself in ancient history but rather has perceived in these
provisions a compendious affirmation of the basic values of a
free society, values that must be given weight in legislation and
29 3
administration at the risk of courting trouble in the courts.

observers can point to instances where principle seems to have been ignored. A frequently
cited example is Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985
(1956), of which Bickel approved. See Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 271, at
174 n.103. Wechsler strongly disagreed. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 34.
I believe, however, that one cannot be blind to the Court's desire to avoid "hot potatoes."
But perhaps attention is better focused upon how well those doctrines constrain generally,
not on the occasions when they fail to do so.
289. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus and the War
on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 352, 359-77 (2010)
(approving review of political science literature). Bickel, of course, does not use the term
as meaning partisan political.
290. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicial Review ch. 3 (1980).
Bickel himself seems to have moved away from that position at the end of his all too short
life. See Alexander Bickel, The Morality of Consent 25-30 (1977); Ely, supra, at 220
nn.130-133.
291. Other difficulties such as indefiniteness to the side, our "perfect" constitution
does not mention such a value even though other constitutions place a high premium on
it. See, e.g., Islamic Unity Convention v. The Indep. Broad. Auth. 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) at
308 para. 30 (S.Afr.) (holding this constitutional value serves as limit on South African
constitution's guarantee of free speech).
292. Stern & Wermiel, supra note 122, at 234.
293. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 19; see also Henry Paul
Monaghan, A Legal Giant Is Dead, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1370, 1372 n.17 (2000) (discussing
Weschler's position).
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And, of course, such conceptions resonate well with those who believe in
a "living constitution," or those who insist that the judicial role is to en294
force natural law.
But the second aspect of Bickel's analysis must be rejected: his claim
that in "defense" of fundamental values, the Court may act in a lawless
manner with respect to its own jurisdiction. (For Bickel, this was a prerogative of the supreme Court alone; inferior courts must "resolve all contro29 5
This
versies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative is chaos.")
position infuriated the People of the Book, and their bishops responded:
"It is simply inadmissible," Herbert Wechsler (albeit not referring to
Bickel by name) proclaimed, "that the highest court of law should be
lawless in relation to its own jurisdiction." 296 He categorically denied that
the Court possessed any open-ended authority to refuse to decide the
29 7
Similarly, Gerald Gunther insisted
merits of cases properly before it.
that the Ashwander canons were "sound and of principled content. . . not
an assertion of a vague Court discretion to deny a decision on the merits
294. E.g., Hadley Arkes, Constitutional Illusions and Anchoring Truths 43-78 (2010)
(arguing Constitution instantiates natural law); David Strauss, The Living Constitution
(2010) (arguing Constitution can sensibly evolve, without falling into anything-goes
flexibility caricatured by opponents). Justice Brennan ultimately came to believe that the
various constitutional guarantees relating to civil liberties could be reduced to a search for
the meaning of human dignity-a mantle Justice Kennedy now seems to have taken up.
Stern & Wermiel, supra note 122, at 342, 418-19, 422-23, 545 ("By the end of his tenure,
Brennan would cite human dignity as 'the basic premise on which I build everything under
the Constitution.'"); see also, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (Kennedy,
J.) ("Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons."). This view
also finds ready acceptance outside the profession. Professor Amartya Sen writes: "But
behind the framers' intentions there was, surely, a social vision of constitutional
appropriateness, which would make room for people with divergent interests and values to
live together (protecting in particular 'the individual's integrity and inherent dignity, as
Bernard Bailyn, the leading historian of the American Revolution, puts it)." Amartya Sen,
Rights, Laws and Language, 31 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 437, 445 (2011). "This enabling
vision may be called 'the constitutional motivation,' and it could even be seen, without
straining our imagination a great deal, as ... the 'intention' of the Constitution." Id. at
445-46. For a comprehensive summary of the role of human dignity in modern
constitutional law, see generally Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional
Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 183 (2011).
295. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 271, at 173.
296. Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections
on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1043, 1061 (1977)
[hereinafter Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction].
297. Id. (discussing Court's "statutory duty to decide appealed cases on the merits");
see also Note, The Discretionary Power of the Supreme Court to Dismiss Appeals from
State Courts, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 688, 707 (1963) (concluding there is no justification for
exercise of such freestanding authority). This discussion does not exhaust the areas in
which judicial authority to decline given jurisdiction may exist; for an argument that a
principled discretion exists because conferral ofjurisdiction is not mandatory, see David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 562-66 (1985). For a review of
the controversy that Professor Shapiro's article created, see generally Daniel J. Meltzer,
Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1891 (2004).
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in a [c]ase within the statutory and constitutional bounds of
29 8
jurisdiction."
There is a sad irony in the transformation of the Brandeis passage into a veritable carte blanche for Court discretion as to jurisdiction; and there is sad irony too in the invocation of
Brandeis' principled concern with threshold questions by members and appraisers of the Court who would assert a virtually
unlimited choice in deciding whether to decide. The neoBrandeisian fallacy has fortunately not yet gained a firm, persistent foothold on the Court ....29
Gunther adds: "The Brandeis rules are a far cry from the neo-Brandeisian
fallacy that there is a general 'Power To Decline the Exercise of
Jurisdiction Which Is Given,' that there is a general discretion not to adjudicate though statute, Constitution, and remedial law present a 'case' for
'300
decision and confer no discretion.
The general tenor of the objections is well taken. Our tradition is
that jurisdictional doctrines are governed by law and must be formulated
and applied in an adequately reasoned, principled manner. And the
Court's discretionary practices must yield to valid statutory constraints on
its authority. 30 1 That said, however, there is, as this Essay argues, much
more unconstrained discretion than appears in the standard accounts of
the judicial duty. Quixotically, the discretion now exercised by the Court
may be even more open-ended than Bickel's: It is a discretion largely designed to allow the Court to avoid or to reach any constitutional ques298. Gunther, supra note 285, at 16. He added that the Court often may and should
avoid "'passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision,'" and "[flour of the seven Brandeis rules involve well-known instances of such
avoidance-avoidance only of some or all of the constitutional questions argued, not
avoidance of all decision on the merits of the case." Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1938) (Brandeis, J.,concurring)). He
further observed:
The remaining rules given by Brandeis deal with situations in which there is no
"case" or "controversy" in terms of the jurisdictional content of Article III ....In
these Brandeis categories, decision on the merits is precluded because the
jurisdictional requirements of Article III are not met; in the earlier ones, the
jurisdiction to decide the merits is in fact exercised and all that is avoided is
decision on some or all of the constitutional issues presented. The only possible
Brandeis contribution to the fallacy lies in his reference to all of the categories as
"cases confessedly within" the Court's jurisdiction. But that referred to the fact
that all of the jurisdictional requirements added by the statute had been met; and
adjudication on the merits did in fact result in all of his categories, except where a
jurisdictional requirement originating in the Constitution had not been satisfied.
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 16 (footnote omitted) (quoting Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra
note 271, at 127).
301. This issue presses most sharply when Congress attempts to limit the Court's
authority to decide cases. For a splendid recent contribution to this topic, see generally
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191 (2007).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 112:665

tions, and a discretion to be exercised not just in the service of defending
fundamental principles.
B. Current Commentators
Several recent articles discuss at least some of the developments this
Essay describes. 30 2 This section focuses on two: Amanda Frost, who addresses the question of issue injection, including the appointment of
amici to defend judgments; 30 3 and Gary Lawson, who defends the efficacy of litigant stipulations and, in the process, criticizes Professor
Frost. 30 4 Both writers share a common starting point: They begin their
analysis by drawing heavily upon understandings of our adversary system
and dispute resolution models. While not identical, each model supposes
a world in which litigants control the litigation: Lawyers present their case
to a neutral, passive judge who decides the case as it is presented.3 0 5 As
Lon Fuller put it, adjudication works best when the judge "rests his deci30 6
sion wholly on the proofs.., actually presented to him by the parties."
In The Limits of Advocacy, Professor Frost begins with a lucid and
thorough discussion of the premises and limitations of the adversary system, which she lays out comprehensively and admirably. 30 7 She avows her
own strong commitment to litigant autonomy in framing and presenting
cases, as well as a fear ofjudicial agenda setting. But, she says, if courts are
to also discharge their duty to say what the law is, she believes that issue
injection is appropriate in limited circumstances: "when the parties, either intentionally or by mistake, misrepresent the law and ask the court to
decide the case on those grounds," or when the litigants purport to disre302. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 132, at 452-53 (arguing judicial issue creation is
necessary to allow judges to make complete pronouncements of law); see also Goldman,
supra note 137, at 940-41 (criticizing Court's appointment of amici to defend judgments).
303. Frost, supra note 132, at 466.
304. Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1191, 1227-33 (2011).
305. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244 (2008) ("'[O]ur adversary
system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are
responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.'" (quoting
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment))).
306. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 388
(1978) (emphasis added); see also David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 1634, 1670 (2009) (discussing adversarial system and truth finding).
307. Professor Frost begins her essay thus:
Party control over case presentation is a central tenet of the American adversarial
legal system. An adversarial system is typically defined as one in which the parties
present the facts and legal arguments to an impartial and passive decisionmaker,
who (hen decides cases on their terms. . . . American judges are strongly
discouraged from engaging in so-called "issue creation"-that is, raising legal
claims and arguments that the parties have overlooked or ignored-on the
ground that doing so is antithetical to a legal culture that values litigant
autonomy and prohibits agenda setting by judges.
Frost, supra note 132, at 449; see also Goldman, supra note 137, at 939-50 (describing
goals of adversary system).

AVOIDINGAVOIDANCE

2012]

gard a statute that, if valid, would be controlling. 30 8 Accordingly, she believes that Washington v. Davis30 9 properly rejected the litigants' submission that the Equal Protection Clause reached conduct having a disparate
racial impact; and similarly, that in Dickerson v. United States3 10 the Fourth
Circuit and the supreme Court correctly raised sua sponte the applicability of a federal statute on the admissibility of confessions. 3 11 (Indeed, in
Dickerson, the Court appointed an amicus to defend the statute's constitutionality.)3 1 2 More importantly here, she insists that the Court must insist
on preserving its own "interpretive methods." 3 13 These are not subject to
the litigants' control, and thus she submits that it is proper for the Court
to prevent parties from avoiding the avoidance canon.3 14 She concludes
hierby arguing that because the supreme Court sits at the top ofjudicial
3 15
archy, it must retain freedom along the dimensions she suggests.
Professor Lawson's recent essay is a lengthy defense of Free
Enterprise's reliance upon the stipulation and a general critique of Frost's
The Limits of Advocacy.3 1 6 He acknowledges that considerable authority
stands against the binding quality of legal stipulations on courts. 3 17 But
for Lawson (though he recognizes that others disagree) the sole function
of the judiciary is that of dispute resolution, a principle fully applicable
whatever the Court's place in the judicial hierarchy. Courts (at least if
possessed with jurisdiction) should resolve the case solely on the facts and
the law submitted to them. 3 18 Professor Lawson's considerable gifts not
withstanding, his inflexible insistence upon an unyielding dispute resolution model is far too idiosyncratic to serve as a vehicle for thinking sensibly about our constitutional order, let alone about the supreme Court's
308. Frost, supra note 132, at 509-10.
309. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
310. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437, 441 n.7 (2000); United States v.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 1999).
311. Frost, supra note 132, at 516. The Court's amicus appointment in Dickerson met
with criticism. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent:
Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 287, 292
(2000) ("[T]he courts exceeded the appropriate judicial role in raising a major
constitutional issue not presented by the parties . .. ").
312. 530 U.S. at 441 n.7. The government insisted that the statute was
unconstitutional. In United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independant Insurance
Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993), litigants assumed that the disputed statute
was in effect, but the court of appeals concluded the statute had been repealed. The
supreme Court determined that the court of appeals had not abused its discretion in
considering the issue of repeal. Id. at 447-48. However, the Court then conducted its own
investigation, concluding that the statute had in fact not been repealed. Id. at 462-63.
313. Frost, supra note 132, at 510.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id. at 514.
Lawson, supra note 304, at 1191.
Id. at 1209 & n.84.

318. Id. at 1218-19.
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place in that order.31 9 His argument, inter alia, is fully consistent with his
well-known rejection of our hierarchical court system based upon binding
precedent.3 20 More importantly, there is no recognition-none-that
the Court is and always has been an important instrument of government;
it is not akin to a traffic court, or a small claims court. Writing in 1977 on
3 21
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, Wechsler, echoing de Tocqueville,
remarked:
My subject, as you know, concerns the jurisdiction of our highest
court, the tribunal that is certainly without an analogue
throughout the world in the magnitude of its responsibilities,
measured by the difficulty and importance of the issues it confronts, the finality of many of its most transforming judgments
short of constitutional amendment, the number of judicial systems from which cases on its docket may derive and the complexity of the mixed legal system in the ordering of which it has
3 22
the final voice.
This was true when de Tocqueville wrote, when Wechsler wrote, and it
remains no less true today.
When all is said and done, the dispute resolution and adversary system models capture a vital aspect of litigation in the United States-but
only partially. In our legal tradition courts are organs of government with
duties and responsibilities that these heuristic models cannot be allowed
to compromise. This seems to me particularly true in the domain of public law and constitutional adjudication, and especially so in the supreme
Court. There are, of course, fairness concerns. Suppose, for example, in
M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton,3 23 a litigant would have received a
favorable judgment had the Court addressed only the questions
presented, but instead lost because the Court resolved the Court-injected
32 4
issue against it. One can understand the appeal of fairness claims here.
Nonetheless, in according wide latitude to the supreme Court in deciding
what to decide, these concerns are properly subordinated to other con319. Indeed, even at the trial court level he cannot account for the practice of the
court, sua sponte, appointing experts or inviting amici.
320. Lawson, supra note 304, at 1228-30.
321. de Tocqueville, supra note 87, at 130 ("The Supreme Court is placed at the head
of all known tribunals, both by the nature of its rights and the class ofjusticiable parties
which it controls.").
322. Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 296, at 1043. There is a "clear
distinction between the obligation of a trial court to decide all the issues fairly presented
and the ability of an appellate court to limit its review to issues of particular importance."
Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1462 (citing Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and
Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15-17 (1994)). This observation is especially
true of the supreme Court, which was the focus of Hart, Wechsler, and Meltzer's writing.
323. 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011).

324. Of course, it is more complicated than that. The Court might not have granted
certiorari, in which case the petitioner would have lost. And, of course, there is the often
invoked, mostly unsuccessfully, argument that the respondent could defend the judgment
on any basis consistent with the record. See supra note 233 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this doctrine.
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siderations in order to allow the Court to discharge its important function as an instrument of governance. So too are concerns over judicial
agenda setting.
C. Hart v. Wechsler
In the end, thinking about the issues I have described brings me all
the way back to what for me was the beginning: the important differences
between Hart and Wechsler. They are, of course usually grouped together-and for very good reason. Wechsler famously insisted that opinions must be adequately principled-his so-called "neutral principles" demand; 3 25 and he criticized important supreme Court decisions, including
Brown itself, as failing that requirement. 326 Hart's Foreword: The Time
Chart of the Justices, published in the very same issue of the HarvardLaw
Review, echoed the same theme. 327 The poor quality of many Warren
Court opinions, Hart insisted, had eroded the confidence in the Court
3 28
among first-class lawyers.
But this general point of agreement concealed an important difference about the role of the supreme Court. Hart believed that the Court's
essential function was to elucidate constitutional meaning,3 29 and he denied that Congress could compromise this function. 33 0 He chided the
Court for wasting its time on trivial, fact-dependent cases. 331 His position
325. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 19. For him, the principles must
be applicable not only to the litigants before the Court, but general enough to be
applicable to similarly situated parties. From the beginning, the demand for "neutral"
principles has drawn skepticism. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 TermNeutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 16 n.87 (2011) (collecting sources). Much of the criticism seems based on
the erroneous premise that a demand for "neutral" principles presupposed a value-free
constitution. That was not Wechsler's view, id. at 16, and is plainly wrong. Professor Kahan
provides a nice summary of the subsequent history of "neutral principles" theory. Id. at
9-19.
326. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 22, 26-27, 32.
327. See generally Hart, Time Chart, supra note 280.
328. Id. at 101.
329. Id. at 99 (describing illumination of "large areas of the law" as the "function
which has to be discharged by the highest judicial tribunal of a nation dedicated to
exemplifying the rule of law"); see also Hart, Exercise in Dialectic, supra note 77, at
1363-66.
330. See Hart, Exercise in Dialectic, supra note 77, at 1365 (arguing congressionally
defined exceptions to supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "must not be such as will
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan").
331. Hart, Time Chart, supra note 280, at 96-99. Hart referred in particular to the
Court's review of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) cases, in which the court
below had taken away jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. (justice Frankfurter had
made a similar attack earlier on hearing FELA cases in his dissent in the "Rogers cases."
Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 524 (1957) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).) Hart was
sharply criticized on that score by Judge Thurman Arnold. Thurman Arnold, Professor
Hart's Theology, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, 1301-02 (1960) ("When .. .the Supreme Court
reviews a negligence case in order to compel courts of appeals to respect jury verdicts, the
Justices are doing far more than merely deciding an isolated evidentiary fact. They are
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pushes strongly towards the law declaration model. Wechsler's inclination
ran very much in the opposite direction. For him, the Court was in important ways no different from other courts. As noted, he emphasized that
the Court could pronounce on constitutional issues only insofar as necessary for the adjudication of the dispute before it, 3 3 2 a dispute which involved claims of right. The Court was not entrusted with general law declaration/judicial superintendence authority, 333 and in that vein Wechsler
believed that nothing in Article III precluded complete congressional
control over the Court's jurisdiction. 33 4 One cannot, however, say much
more about the differences between these great scholars because neither
developed his views in any real detail, and the potential difference between the two models were not perceived to be as sharp then as we now
understand them to be.
In the end, however, what we see in the developments this Essay describes is the triumph of Hart; that is, in the supreme Court at least, the
triumph of the law declaration model, albeit circumscribed by premises
thinly carried from the dispute resolution model. The Court displays a
strong appetite for (1) the final say on any constitutional issue appropriate for judicial resolution by any other court; and (2) maximum freedom
in agenda setting, quite irrespective of the litigants' wishes.
IV.

AGENDA CONTROL AND LEGAL REASONING

I do not wish to overclaim the results of the cases discussed. But to
the extent that this Essay is correct, what must one conclude about the
appropriate role of the Court in our current constitutional order?
Ashwander, and its underlying jurisprudence, still have an agreeable
resonance in our legal culture however much it lacks grounding in the
Court's actual on-the-ground practice. But what of the new,
jurisprudential-less constitutional order, one in which the Court asserts a
rather free standing agenda control? The unease the emerging order creates can be examined along many dimensions, including separation of
laying down a principle vital to the security of lowly litigants."). The criticism was right. I
can remember to this day Simon Sobeloff, a man I revered and who was then Chief Judge
of the Fourth Circuit, telling me that the Court's FELA decisions made clear to him that
jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiff were not to be set aside by judges. For another round
in this battle, with the jury verdict upheld, see the Court's 5-4 opinion in CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011).
332. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. For Wechsler, this fact cured any
countermajoritarian difficulty. See Wechsler, Courts and Constitution, supra note 83, at
1003, 1008 (listing this restriction as "practical, political limit[] on the power of the Court
to bind the other branches and the States").
333. See Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 27, at 5-6 ("The [Court's] duty...
is not that of policing or advising legislatures or executives, nor even ... of standing as an
ever-open forum for the ventilation of all grievances that draw upon the Constitution for
support.").
334. See Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 296, at 1047 ("[T]he
constitutional position... permitted the scope of federal judicial jurisdiction-both initial
and appellate-to be shaped by Congress . . ").
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powers, federalism, and due process. This Part, however, focuses on a
different question: Assuming, as I do, that the process of constitutional
adjudication is not simply politics caried out in another forum, to what
extent does the Court's expanded agenda control freedom involve an exercise of legal reasoning? Or is the discretion so untethered, so polycentric, that it cannot bear such a characterization? 33 5 Can such questions be
addressed categorically, or only on a topic-by-topic basis?
That judicial tribunals must act in a reasoned manner is now deeply
ingrained in our culture. 336 On important matters, these reasons are expected to be made publically available, and in written form.3 3 7 In a way,
the latter demands are odd. Neither the Constitution nor the First
Judiciary Act imposes such requirements 33 8-especially the now common
demand for written reasons. And no due process right to reasons exists, as
opposed to fair procedures. Yet, as the considerable and rich literature
on the topic shows, our legal culture demands them for (most?) important judicial rulings. (The usual justifications are cast in terms of judicial

335. Put differently, do its exercises entail too many interdependent variables to be
resolved in a systematic, rational, and orderly manner? This, of course, draws upon Fuller,
supra note 306, at 394-98 (defining and giving examples of polycentric tasks).
336. This paragraph draws on excellent and informative analysis, citations, and
literature review in Mathilde Cohen, Because I Said So: Federal Courts' Ipse Dixit Problem
(Sept. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Another valuable contribution is Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models
of Adjudication and the Duty to Decide, 94 Geo. L.J. 121 (2005).
337. Describing the views of Eisenberg and Fuller, Professor Oldfather adds,
"opinions are valuable because they help to ensure the parties that their presentation of
proofs and arguments was not in vain, and because the requirement of issuing an opinion
also disciplines the court to consider those proofs and arguments." Oldfather, supra note
336, at 176. And, of course, the Court itself expects to issue written opinions. Supreme
Court Rule 41 provides that "[o]pinions of the Court will be released by the Clerk
immediately upon their announcement from the bench, or as the Court otherwise directs."
Sup. Ct. R. 41. Kathryn Watts reminds us that Justice Field wrote an opinion for the
California Supreme Court invalidating a legislative demand for reasoned judicial decision.
Watts, supra note 91, at 50 (referring to Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859) and citing
to People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550-53 (Cal. 2006) for discussion of issue's subsequent
history).
338. The Judiciary Act of 1789 required the clerks of all federal courts to maintain
accurate records concerning orders, decrees, judgments, etc., but said nothing about
opinions. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 7, 1 Stat. 73, 76; see also John Harrison, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 230 (1997) ("Neither the Constitution nor the Judiciary Act of 1789
provided for the delivery of written opinions, let alone their public distribution."). Indeed,
the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require publically available reasons in only
limited circumstances. Fed. R- Civ. P. 52(a) (bench trials); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1) (a)
(injunctions). The district court must, of course, enter a judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, but
not an opinion. See also Fed. R. App. P. 36 (describing method of entering judgment with
or without opinion). But the increased volume of cases has compromised the reason-giving
function of courts, particularly in the courts of appeals. Hart & Wechsler, supra note 18, at
44-45 nn.171-172.

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 112:665

transparency and accountability as well as citizen participation.) 339 Indeed, political theorists point to supreme courts, especially our supreme
340
Court, as the paradigmatic examples of reason-giving institutions.
Perhaps more to the point here, principled, adequately reasoned,
professionally crafted decisionmaking is seen as an indispensable hallmark of legitimate judicial decisionmaking, especially by the supreme
Court. As James Boyd White wrote:
One can have law of a certain kind without the judicial opinion,
then, perhaps of a good kind. But with the opinion, a wholly
different dimension of legal life and thought becomes possible-the systematic and reasoned invocation of the past as precedent. With this practice, in turn, there can emerge an institution that simultaneously explains and limits itself over time. It is
here, in the creation of legal authority, rather than in the facilitation of prediction, 341
that the opinion performs its peculiar and
most important task.
There are dissenters, of course. Consider, for example, Professor Segall's
interview with Judge Posner in which Segall said:
So in my perfect world, Justice Kennedy would have said in
Roper "I think it is wrong to execute people under seventeen,
the text is ambiguous, and the precedent goes both ways. We
have a degree of discretion in deciding the case and I can't help
but bring my personal values to that. I am in power and I get to say
342
and I think it is wrong to execute juveniles."
No one doubts that this in fact happens, and Professor Segal's example strikes me as well chosen. But how long would the Court's claim to
legitimacy last on this view, one in which the justices claimed a sweeping
339. "A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions-grounds of decision
that can be debated, attacked, and defended-serves a vital function in constraining the
judiciary's exercise of power." David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 731, 737 (1987). Moreover, opinions and adjudication are linked: "Writing affects
how judges judge. The opinion form also affects what questions judges believe they may
decide and how they may decide them." David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics
of the Judicial Office, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 509, 513 (2001).
340. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political
Debate 156 (2006) (identifying courts as "prime forums" for societal debates);John Rawls,
The Idea of Public Reason, in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics 93,
108-14 (james Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) (describing supreme Court as
"exemplar" of public reason that should govern public affairs). Judicial opinions are all
about reasons, as every law school professor or student knows. But it goes without saying
that the philosophers are mistaken: law professors, not supreme courts, are the real
paradigm for legal reasoning.
341. James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1363, 1367
(1995).
342. Eric J. Segall, The Court: A Talk with Judge Richard Posner, N.Y. Rev. Books,
Sept. 29, 2011, at 48 (emphasis added). Recall here, the brouhaha created when the courts
of appeals sought to discount the precedential effect of their "unpublished" opinions. For
a discussion, see generally William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice,
49 Duq. L. Rev. 35 (2011) (arguing practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions
undermines justice itself).
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right to reject legislation on the basis of personal reasons, rather than on
the basis of justifications that purport to be public-regarding and publically acceptable? (I cannot imagine the structure of the argument before
the Court,3 43 or the form of the opinion.)3 44 When Hart and Wechsler
each claimed that the reasons advanced in the Warren Court's constitutional decisions were often shoddily reasoned, they created a very considerable stir.
But what counts as a good legal reason in constitutional interpretation as opposed to a simply good reason? This is a thicket too dense to
enter here, but the general idea seems to be that legal reasoning generally and constitutional interpretation in particular limit the sources from
which reasons can be properly fashioned, and that rational, publically acceptable reasons must be proffered. 34 5 Unsurprisingly, controversies
large and small appear after this point. Writing about substantive constitutional principles, commentators such as Jeff Powell, Charles Fried,
Philip Bobbitt, Suzanna Sherry, and Richard Fallon place emphasis on
different substantive factors. 3 4 6 ForJeff Powell, this tradition rules out any
"'all-things-considered"' discretion in the courts. 34 7 Fuller would agree;
343. Counsel: Based on the Court's precedents, I believe that the appropriate rule
is ....
Court: Counsel, we got the power.
Counsel: You got the power?
Court: Yes, we got the power.
Counsel: You got the power!!
344. Imagine the following newspaper report: "The Supreme Court handed down six
decisions today. Two involved standard legal reasoning. Four highly controversial and
divided rulings were rendered in the newly announced 'we got the power' mode."
345. The dissenting opinion in Garcia v. Texas, after the Court had finally recessed for
summer, seems to go beyond the pale of legal reasoning. 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868-71 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court, citing its prior decisions in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008) and Medellin v. Texas, 554 U.S. 759, 760 (2008) (per curiam), denied a stay of
execution based upon a violation of the Vienna Convention. Garcia,131 S.Ct. at 2867. The
Court had previously held the Convention did not operate as internal law and the
President had no authority to change that. Id. at 2869. The petitioner advanced the
"meritless"-l would call preposterous-claim that it violated due process to execute him
"while [potentially helpful] legislation is under consideration." Id. at 2867. Moreover, the
petitioner made no claim of prejudice from the Convention violation, so that any violation
was harmless error. The United States supported a stay to let Congress consider the
legislation. Id. This would assist the President in managing foreign relations and prevent
the United States from breaching its treaty obligations. But no claim of right was asserted,
or could be after Medellin. In other words, the United States asked the Court to do the
President a favor. No substantial jurisdiction-conferring claim of right was alleged by the
petitioner or the United States, and thus no case or controversy existed on the theory of
the amicus. See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576-78 (1926).
346. See infra notes 347-349 and accompanying text (examining the works of these
scholars).
347. H. Jefferson Powell, Further Reflections on Not Being "Not an Originalist," 7 U.
St. Thomas L.J. 288, 292 (2010) (quoting Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A
New Introduction to Legal Reasoning 67 (2009)); cf. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty:
Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 12 (2005) (urging judges interpreting the
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for him, such a standard would be an example of managerial
348
discretion.
In the end, these writers do come to center ground on the common
law mode of adjudication, with its emphasis on reasoning from precedent
and by analogy. 3 49 Explicitly or implicitly, they reject this generation's
version of original understanding theory, with its endless, mindnumbing,
hairsplitting linguistic refinements and its microscopic examination of
each word and punctuation mark in the constitutional text.3 50 With this
criticism, I am in full sympathy. Constitutions are not forged in seminar
rooms. While unrelenting focus on history can yield only partial guidance, 3 51 the common law mode accurately describes the process of conConstitution and statutes to consider "the Constitution's democratic objective" and place
"considerable importance upon consequences").
348. Fuller, supra note 306, at 398-404. I believe that the phenomena I am describing
exceeds the range of discretion inherent in the disputes between judges who prefer rules
and judges amenable to more open-ended standards. For recent discussion, see Jamal
Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 Geo. L.J. 1289, 1289-90 (2011).
349. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 5 (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation]; Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan
Revolution-A First Hand Account 66 (1991); Powell, supra note 347, at 291-92; Suzanna
Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 Const. Comment. 461, 461 & n.2
(2009). Fried and Bobbitt draw more explicitly on 1789, emphasizing the modes of
common law argument; Fried emphasizes reliance upon analogy and precedent, to which
Sherry adds "institutional structure and context, and . . . professional norms." Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation, supra, at 5; Fried, supra, at 66; Sherry, supra, at 461. Bobbitt
points to the common law mode of reasoning: "The ways in which Americans interpret the
Constitution could have been different .... For Americans, however, these ways have taken
the forms of common law argument, those forms prevailing at the time of the drafting and
ratification of the US Constitution." Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra, at 5.
Fallon draws heavily upon conventional understanding of our practice. See generally
Richard H. Fallon, Implementing the Constitution (2001) (analyzing "prominent theories"
of supreme Court constitutional interpretation to suggest "a good theory ... must come to
terms with accepted practice"). Bobbitt's well-known "modalities" are far more openended: text, history, structure, prudence, and the values peculiar to the Constitution
(ethos), none of which has any claim to priority. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate
3-8 (1982). But these references are to current practice, not early constitutional history.
Id. at 9-24. For a recent, elaborate description of the various interpretive techniques that
have actually been used by the Court, see generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Methods of
Interpretation: How the Supreme Court Reads the Constitution (2009).
350. See Powell, supra note 347, at 303 (describing shortcomings of originalism);
Sherry, supra note 349, at 462 (arguing "grand theories" like originalism fail to impose
meaningful discretion on judges). Bobbitt does not address these writers explicitly because
they wrote after he had written the works on constitutional theory referred to here. But I
suspect he would have little sympathy. Moving well beyond the common law of 1789,
Bobbitt lists a well-known range of "modalities" of appropriate constitutional argumentseach equally valid and for him none hierarchically superior. See Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 792-93 (2010) [hereinafter
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism] (noting "originalism is by no means the
only... form of constitutional interpretation that is broadly accepted today").
351. This seems to me especially clear with respect to the common law's substantive
interpretive principles (as opposed to its mode of adjudication). Professor Bobbitt writes:
"Thus the methods hitherto used to construe deeds and wills and contracts and promissory
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stitutional adjudication that appeared from the beginning and solidified
after the Civil War: analogical, precedent-driven reasoning.3 52 This was in
a sense inevitable. The Court has always considered constitutional cases
just as it considered common law, statutory, and admiralty cases. They sat
side-by-side on its docket; briefs and oral arguments were taken; and the
written opinions issued referred to prior cases and reasoned by analogy.
notes, methods confined to the mundane subjects of the common law, became the
methods of constitutional construction once the state itself was put under law." Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 349, at 5. Reliance on the substantive interpretive
practices of the English courts was certainly one aspect of the Constitution's background.
But I doubt that the common law rules of interpretation governing written instruments
could have provided a sufficient toolkit for construing a document such as the
Constitution-a document that, in Farrand's words, was a "bundle of compromises." Max
Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 201 (1913). The
Constitutional Convention was certainly "a cumulative process of bargaining and
compromise," if not a "seminar in political theory." Jack N. Rakove, The Great
Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of Constitution Making, 44 Win. & Mary Q.
Rev. 424, 424, 456 (1987). One must be careful not to overstate the matter, however. Much
was in fact settled by the Constitution, such as the unitary President, two senators from
each state, and one "supreme Court." See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1; id. art. I, § 3; id. art. III,
§ 1. Common law rules of construction governing contracts, wills, and trusts could not
possibly resolve the broad and significant interpretive conflicts that existed among both
the Framers and the ratifiers. Professor Forrest McDonald, a leading historian, writes:
Because the United States had not one body of lawgivers but thirteen, and
because the thirteen states had thirteen different histories, cultures, heritagessometimes widely different . . . it follows that what those lawgivers understood
they were doing varied from state to state ....
All the states ratified the same
Constitution, but each read it and understood it in its own way.
Forrest McDonald, Foreword to M.E. Bradford, Original Intentions: On the Making and
Ratification of the United States Constitution, at ix, x (1993). See generally Monaghan,
Supremacy Clause Textualism, supra note 350, for further discussion of originalism as a
guide to constitutional adjudication. The indeterminacy problem is also readily apparent
throughout the document, on issues both large and small. What, for example, was the
original understanding of the meaning of a civil trial by jury? See U.S. Const. amend. VII
("In suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... ").
In interpreting the Constitution, there was much concern (at least in the Congress)
with the text, and "textualism." This emerges quite clearly from reading the late David
Currie's wonderful volumes on the Constitution in Congress. See Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, supra note 350, at 783 (collecting sources). Moreover, in 1789 there
was no settled tradition of precedent in the English legal system. See Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 763 (1988)
(discussing "widely divergent" interpretations of meaning of precedent in eighteenthcentury English legal system). And in McCulloch v. Maryland,Justice Marshall went out of
his way to emphasize that the Constitution lacked "the prolixity of a legal code;" rather,
"only its great outlines [are] marked." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Whether one
would have thought that a legal system built around principles derived from the
construction of deeds and wills was adequate for constructing the Constitution is not clear.
But see Snowiss, supra note 20, at 3-4, 10-12 ("Modern constitutional law evolved over the
course of the nineteenth century by merging political components of fundamental law, as
originally understood, with ordinary law attributes and technique."). Marshall himself, as
noted, preferred to reason from first principles, not by analogy or precedent.
352. The Constitution's "origin and the line of [its] growth," as Holmes put it, provide
the basis for judicial reasoning. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
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The process in which interpretation occurred meant the common law
353
mode would envelope the process of constitutional adjudication.
History, however, is not the focus of this Essay. The central question
remains what kind of reasons can be counted as acceptable legal ones in
constitutional adjudication? Criticism of Bickel largely focused on his willingness to manipulate justiciability doctrine, which Bickel's critics believed effectively placed these doctrines beyond the pale of principled
legal reasoning. But Bickel also urged use of certiorari denial as a mechanism to avoid validating principle-infringing legislation. While we certainly do not expect written explanations on certiorari denials, 35 4 Bickel
presents an important challenge: Do legal standards nonetheless exist
that properly structure the Court's decisions to take or not take a case,
and what issues to decide? Or is this an area appropriate for the exercise
of freestanding, unstructured, "all things considered," Bickelian-inspired
prudential discretion? Wechsler himself believed that the certiorari process was one governed by law. He pointed to the standards contained in
the Court's Rule 10, and he urged the development of further and more
355
refined standards.
I confess considerable doubt. Rule 10 seems to me largely directionless,356 and it is of no help in the cases Bickel cared about. Suppose,
for example, that a state court held that a ban on gay marriage violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Should the Court grant certiorari, even if a
circuit conflict existed on the issue? If it did, should it seek an avoidance
ground for decision? In either situation, could a member of the Court
legally reason, "I realize that the petition presents a societally important
constitutional question and there are arguments on both sides, but 'all
things considered' I would prefer to leave the state court decision in
place at this time because I believe it to be a socially, progressive position,
a position consistent with the Court's evolving standards of equality and
one which (with Justice X's retirement) we might ultimately adopt"?
353. What I am less clear about is whether the common law rules of interpretation of
written documents were also absorbed, as Snowiss and Bobbitt contend.
354. Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.)
("Since there are . . . conflicting and, to the uniformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude.").
355. Wechsler, Appellate Jurisdiction, supra note 296, at 1061-64 (noting "the
importance of a viable procedure . . . applying principles and standards the Supreme
Court has developed," and discussing multiple proposed refined standards). Professor
Watts, by contrast, urges (in the interests of accountability, oversight, and public
participation) greater amici participation at the certiorari stage as well as the recording of
judicial votes in order to constrain the certiorari process. Watts, supra note 91, at 46-61.
For additional discussion of proposed "reforms" of the Court's certiorari process, see Hart
& Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1477-78.
356. Rule 10 does admonish the bar of an important point. The petition is not a
merits brief. The point of the petition is to persuade the Court that what is involved is an
important issue calling for the Court's resolution, and to cast doubt that the decision
below was correctly decided.
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Less charged, less visible, examples of the problem in fact exist. Beer
v. United States, decided at the very end of the last Term, concerned the
claim of eight former and current federal judges that their failure to receive cost-of-living increases unconstitutionally diminished their salaries. 3 5 7 The Federal Circuit held that claims were barred by a prior
Federal Circuit decision, which in turn had relied upon a supreme Court
precedent.3 5 8 The Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment
for consideration of the question of preclusion raised by the
Acting Solicitor General ....The Court considers it important
that there be a decision on the question, rather than that an
answer be deemed unnecessary in light of prior precedent on
the merits. Further proceedings after decision of the preclusion
question are for the Court of Appeals to determine in the first
instance. Justice Breyer would grant the
petition for writ of certi3 59
orari and set the case for argument.
Justice Scalia dissented:
It has been my consistent view, not always shared by the Court,
that "we have no power to set aside the duly recorded judgments
of lower courts unless we find them to be in error, or unless they
360
are cast in doubt by a factor arising after they were rendered."
Beer directs an inferior federal court to decide an issue in order to
spare the Court (at least temporarily) the necessity of deciding a constitutional question. No such authority would be claimed (at least overtly)
over a state supreme court. And what the Court in effect said was, "at this
time (a substantial economic downturn accompanied by so much concern over the national debt) we really do not want to decide this constitutional question either on our own or by reaffirming a precedent." One
does not, however, detect any sense of Ashwander compulsion concerning
rules fashioned "for its own governance," 3 61 just a pragmatic assessment
that it is better for now to let the constitutional question go.
CONCLUSION. WHAT ROUGH BEAST . . .

The discretion exercised by the Court in issue selection (as opposed
to decision on the merits) often will run past the outer edges of what
counts as legal reasoning in the interpretive context.362 Too many inter357. 131 S. Ct. 2865 (2011).
358. Beer v. United States, 592 F. App'x 150 (Fed. Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2865.
359. 131 S. Ct. at 2865-66.
360. Id. at 2866 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Webster v. Cooper, 130 Ct. 456, 457
(2009)).
361. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Rather, the issue seems more tightly bound to the role of compromise in the
process of constitutional adjudication. See Levinson, supra note 232, at 832-33 (noting
possible compromises and factors weighed in certain decisions to deny certiorari).
362. Or perhaps one should rethink the nature of what counts as legal reasoning in
the context of a "supreme Court." In any event, to be clear, I do not claim that the Court
can disregard controlling acts of Congress mandating decision on the merits.
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dependent variables seem properly at play. But sustained exploration of
that large topic is for another day, and for abler minds. So, too, is the
question of how one would describe the role of the supreme Court in the
current constitutional order, a court with a desire for the last word and
extensive freedom in issue selection.
Insofar as the Court has expanded its ability to have the final say on
any constitutional question capable of judicial resolution, the result
seems to be consistent with its current place in our constitutional order,
and with popular expectations, as well as what the "reasoning class" would
expect.363 The fundamental animating premise of this development rejects Wechsler's conception, still shared by others, that the supreme
Court is there to be used only when Congress wishes to use it. Having the
final say entrenches the Court's role of helping to ensure stability, coherence, and unity in the legal system, a role that the Court has claimed
(sometimes unsuccessfully) from the beginning. In any event, if we were
to design a constitutional system today, surely our conception of a
supreme Court would at least start from a "final say" default position.
Problems occur at the second level, however. As the Court seeks to
establish an unfettered prerogative over what issues to decide, particularly by adding questions and amici to defend judgments, I am less certain. The Court's newly acquired freedom allows it-not the litigants-to
shape the disputes before it. How much such freedom should exist here
seems highly contestable. And so with apologies to Mr. Yeats in The Second
Coming, I am inclined to ask "What rough beast, its hour come round at
364
last, Slouches towards [Washington] to be born?"

363. See Ely, supra note 290, at 56-60 (describing reason as one source of
fundamental values).
364. William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming, in Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats 184,
184-85 (1953).

